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Rethinking Injury:
The Case of Informed Consent
Erin Sheley*
ABSTRACT
This article argues that the traditional debates between the
expressive and compensatory views of tort law ignore the way in which
an injury may itself have an expressive component, one that in turn
increases the extent of physical harm suffered by a victim. I take up the
example of informed consent in the medical malpractice context to show
how an excessively narrow idea of physical harm has negative
consequences for tort law in general. In these situations, when a
physician performs a procedure without providing the patient with
sufficient information, we can better understand the harm that occurs
through a combination of civil recourse theory and new insights from
the field of narrative medicine. Under the current regime, the effort to
cabin potential liability for physicians’ well-intended conduct has
resulted in a disconnect between a negligence standard—with its
requirement of strictly physical injury—and the actual harm in
question, which has historically been recognized as at least partially
dignitary. I argue that this disconnect can be resolved through a
broader view of the nature of the injury suffered when a physician
performs an inadequately authorized procedure. A more appropriate
view would take into account the newly understood, long-term physical
harms that arise when a physician co-opts a patient’s subjective
knowledge about and narrative control over his body. I then argue that
by focusing on remedies that consider the relational quality of the injury
imposed on patients in these cases, tort scholars can be more responsive to

*Assistant Professor, University of Calgary Faculty of Law. Many thanks to Marshall Alcorn,
Andrew Bradt, Patrick Barry, Samuel Bray, Jay Butler, Donald Braman, David Fontana,
Kristelia Garcia, Jody Madeira, Herschel Nachlis, Naomi Schoenbaum, Peter Smith, and
Robert Tuttle, as well as the participants in the Young Legal Scholars Conference, the
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actual harms, not only in the case of informed consent but also
throughout the tort regime generally.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a longstanding question whether tort law is better
understood as a system for allocating losses through compensation
or as a process through which parties obtain formal recourse for
wrongs done to them. 1 The practical divergence between these two
positions becomes particularly clear in the realm of “dignitary” torts
such as battery. Compensation theory, the dominant view, has
difficulty accounting for how the law permits claims in circumstances
where no quantifiable physical injury has occurred. Some scholars
have therefore suggested that such actions serve a theoretically
distinct punitive or expressive purpose. 2 Civil recourse theorists, on
the other hand, argue that if we understand the unwanted touching
itself as a form of wrong, then such a “harmless” battery is a
completed, legally cognizable injury, theoretically no different from
other types of torts. 3 In this article I will take up the specific example
of informed consent to show how the divisions created by this
1. For examples of the compensation model see, e.g., JOHN G. FLEMING, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (1967) (describing the principal function of tort
law as adjusting compensation for the costs of “industrial operations, methods of transport,
and many another activity benignly associated with the ‘modern way of life’”); P.S. ATIYAH,
ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 239 (3d ed. 1980) (describing tort law as the
rules governing compensation for “road accidents”); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 312 (1970). For articulations of the wrongsbased conception see, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 134–35 (1995);
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 918–20
(2010); and Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the ‘Crisis’: a Reassessment of Current
Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 778 (1987).
2. See, e.g., Bruce Chapman & Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in
Search of a Rationale 40 ALA. L. REV. 741, 768–69 (1989) (suggesting that punitive damages
serve to provide remedies for non-compensatory losses); Robert Cooter, Punitive Damages,
Social Norms, and Economic Analysis, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 75 (1997) (describing
dignitary torts as a “narrow class” of cases in which the common law provided for
punitive damages).
3. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 938–39 (“Although tort law often is
concerned to address conduct that causes physical harms or property damage, it is a mistake to
suppose that these forms of injury have a special claim to being central to the subject of torts. .
. . Even battery is not precisely concerned with physical harm. Rather, it is the wrong of
invading another person’s personal space . . . irrespective of whether the touching causes
harm.”); see also Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal
Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1404–05 (1993); Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive
Damages Do?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163 (2003).
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debate in tort theory have contributed to a flawed understanding of
the concept of injury.
Today’s informed consent law has evolved with a hybrid of
dignitary and compensatory purposes. Courts originally recognized
patient claims against physicians who performed unauthorized
procedures under battery law. But, starting in the mid-twentieth
century, courts began to decide such cases under negligence. I will
argue that this shift has resulted in a class of factually injured patients
who have no remedy under current law, with consequences for our
broader understanding of tort injury. The bright line between
dignitary and bodily injuries imposed by compensation theory
ignores the extent to which dignitary harms may constitute physical
injuries. While civil recourse theory is better on this point, it too has
problems. Most significantly, its concept of a “completed” injury
inconsistently recognizes the expressive component of bodily torts.
To understand the practical costs of inadequately defining injury,
consider the story of one breast cancer patient.
When Carolyn Alford arrived at the hospital on the morning she
was to receive a biopsy on a lump in her breast, she asked her doctor
if he thought the surgery would “go OK.” 4 She recalls that he
replied, “Why, you’ll be talking to your husband by 10 or even
10:30.” 5 According to Alford, the doctor said nothing to suggest the
possibility of his performing a mastectomy. When she woke up to a
burning pain stretching from her armpit down to her waist and a
clock that read four o’clock, Alford “knew the worst had
happened.” 6 The surgeon had found a malignant tumor, though
(according to Alford) one the size of a BB, which did not appear to
have spread. 7 With only her husband’s permission, the surgeon
removed Alford’s breast, both pectoral muscles, chest wall, and the
lymph glands under her arm. 8 Beyond those losses, as Alford would
subsequently testify to Congress, “I LOST CONTROL. Just because

4. Progress in Controlling Breast Cancer: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and
Long-Term Care of the Select Comm. on Aging, H.R., 98th Cong. 46 (1984) (statement of
Carolyn Alford) (quoted in Carolyn Montini, Gender and Emotion in the Advocacy for Breast
Cancer Informed Consent Legislation 10 GENDER & SOC’Y 9, 18 (1996)).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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a person is put to sleep, he should not lose control of their
[sic] life.” 9
Alford’s nightmare occurred in the early 1980s. This was before
the start of a nation-wide lobbying effort to protect breast cancer
patients from physicians performing mastectomies without providing
information about other, less invasive options such as lumpectomies.
At the time, because the mastectomy itself had been successful,
Alford had no legal recourse for the fact that she was given
inadequate information about the range of potential treatment
options before going under. Due in part to an increased cultural
concern for patient autonomy in the face of potential overreaching
by doctors (including, in some states, legislation on informed
decision-making 10), stories as dramatic as Alford’s are less frequent
today, though still not eradicated. 11 In fact, her testimony about loss
of control serves to illustrate a type of harm commonly associated
with a physician’s failure to obtain a patient’s informed consent,
which today remains imperfectly protected by the tort regime.
In addition to physical injury such as the loss of a breast, a
patient like Alford clearly suffers psychological harm: she has had her
will overborne by a physician in the context of a deeply intimate and
potentially identity-changing decision. Even in cases less dramatic
than a mastectomy, a patient suffers this harm when his physician
performs a procedure more invasive than what he would have chosen
with more information. In general, tort law recognizes damages for
psychological harm under the doctrine of negligent infliction of
emotional distress (NIED). However, psychological harms cannot
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 109277 (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 458.324,
459.0125 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-21 (2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-3 (1993
& Supp. 2006); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT.2310/2310-345 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 652836(m) (2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.935 (West 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§40:1300.151–.154 (2001); MD. ANN. CODE, HEALTH–GEN. § 20-113 (LexisNexis 2005);
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 14-404 (LexisNexis 2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
111 § 70E(h) (West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.17013–.17513 (2001); MINN. STAT. §
144.651(9) (2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1250 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-3-333
(2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2-168, 45:9-22.3a, .3b; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§2404–
2409 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2007); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§5641–5642 (West 2007);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 86.001–.005, .011–.012 (West2001 & Supp. 2006);
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2971 (2005), W. VA. CODE § 16-33-1 to -12 (2006).
11. See Rachael Andersen-Watts, The Failure of Breast Cancer Informed Consent Statutes,
14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 201, 209–10 (2008); Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 411, 420–21 (2006); Clarence H. Braddock et al, Informed Decision Making
in Outpatient Practice: Time to Get Back to Basics, 282 JAMA 2313 (1999).
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usually form the sole basis for a tort claim in the absence of physical
injury or threat thereof. 12 Therefore, most patients cannot recover
under NIED unless their unauthorized procedure has in some way
gone wrong. Under the earlier battery standard a patient could have
recovered for the pure “dignitary” harm of having been touched
without consent. But today’s negligence standard requires a showing
of physical injury to state a claim.
The problem is that the current law ignores patients whose
physical injuries are not readily apparent. Yet patients who have made
decisions without adequate information have often suffered physical
damage as a result of psychological harm. As I will demonstrate, the
literature in the newly developing field of narrative medicine suggests
that a patient’s experience of lack of control over his treatment can
itself contribute to physical harm. The tort system currently ignores
this insofar as it defines a legally cognizable injury for the purposes of
establishing a claim of negligence with respect to informed consent.
Recognizing this injury would therefore fundamentally change how
certain informed consent cases come out and at least partially resolve
a number of theoretical problems with the negligence test.
In this Article I argue that the current law of informed consent in
the medical malpractice context is based on an excessively narrow
idea of physical harm, which has negative consequences for tort law.
Tort scholars can understand the nature of this harm better by
considering, through the wrongs-based framework of civil recourse
theory, what the field of narrative medicine reveals about the
importance of patient subjectivity to physical healing. In Part II, I
demonstrate how the current understanding of injury under
informed consent law is the product of a haphazard historical
evolution from the doctrinal framework of battery to that of
negligence. In Part III, I show how the current definition of injury
under the negligence framework fails for a number of reasons. First,
it ignores new medical understandings about the physical harms that
occur when physicians interfere with a patient’s particular illness
12. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) (“If the actor’s conduct is
negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional
disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm
or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance.” (emphasis
added)) with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 47 (“An actor
whose negligent conduct causes serious emotional harm to another is subject to liability to the
other if the conduct . . . places the other in danger of immediate bodily harm and the
emotional harm results from the danger.”).
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narrative. Second, the definition of injury in these cases is
inconsistent with the expression of subjective values in other areas of
tort law. And, third, it distorts the doctor-patient relationship by
inappropriately evaluating a patient’s desire for information by a
“reasonable man” standard. Because this standard arose in other
areas of tort law, it assumes the existence of information in the first
place and is therefore inappropriate in the informed consent context.
In Part IV, I propose a new standard and the remedial rules to
support it.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF INFORMED CONSENT DOCTRINE
Most cases of informed consent are less black and white than
Carolyn Alford’s unconscious mastectomy. The question that forms
the basis for a tort claim in such cases frequently arises in a far greyer
space: whether the physician provided enough information about a
course of treatment and its alternatives to render the patient’s
consent to such a treatment valid. When a physician’s failure to
obtain consent was first recognized as a tort in the early twentieth
century, it was understood to relate to the duty to respect autonomy:
an uninformed medical procedure, insofar as it is a usurpation of a
patient’s bodily integrity, was considered a battery. 13 The law
assumed that the wrong suffered by a non-consenting patient was
not a quantifiable loss requiring compensation in the amount of its
value, but an intentionally inflicted dignitary wrong recognized as
such regardless of whether physical harm resulted. 14 Indeed, under
today’s regime, a procedure performed without consent (as opposed
to consent obtained in the absence of full information) remains a
battery. 15 As the doctrine of informed consent evolved over the
course of the century, courts—due in part to a reluctance to hold
physicians accountable in battery for the primarily well-intentioned
exercise of their medical judgment—shifted to a negligence standard,
13. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent,
commits an assault . . . .”).
14. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 938.
15. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“It is the settled
rule that therapy not authorized by the patient may amount to a tort—a common law
battery—by the physician.” (citing Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941) and
cases collected in W. E. Shipley, Annotation, Liability of Physician or Surgeon for Extending
Operation or Treatment Beyond that Expressly Authorized,56 A.L.R.2d 695, 697–99 (1957)).
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asking three questions: First, whether a physician breached his duty
to provide an adequate amount of information to the patient.
Second, whether the patient would have made a different treatment
decision in the absence of this breach. And, third, whether a legally
cognizable injury resulted from the treatment. 16 In this section I will
survey the continued theoretical justifications for recognizing
informed consent torts in the first place and demonstrate how they
serve as a basis for a false dichotomy as to the values at stake. I will
then briefly explain the evolution of the tort from its origins in
battery to the current negligence standard.
A. A Tale of Two Duties: Autonomy and Beneficence
The debate about the amount of information a physician must
disclose to a patient while obtaining consent has centered in large
part around two core values related to a physician’s duty to his
patient: beneficence (the duty to do good), and respect for patient
autonomy. 17 Due to the fact that a physician’s judgment of what
constitutes the most medically beneficent course of treatment may
go against a patient’s personal preference, courts and scholars
frequently discuss these two values as potentially in conflict. 18
16. See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at791.
17. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 12 (5th ed. 2001).
18. See, e.g., Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent:
The Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. &MED. 429, 435 (2006) (“The
most challenging dilemma in establishing an effective informed consent practice is balancing a
physician’s obligation to protect the patient’s health through beneficence and the physician’s
obligation to respect the patient’s autonomy.”); Jay Katz, Human Experimentation and
Human Rights, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 19 (1993) (“[T]he argument goes, any respect for
patient autonomy must be balanced against the principle of beneficence, of caring for the
suffering patient who happens to be also a subject of research. In countless conversations with
physician-investigators, I have heard paternalism and beneficence, and not respect for
autonomy, defended as guiding principles for the conduct of research.”); Alison Patrucco
Barnes, Beyond Guardianship Reform: A Reevaluation of Autonomy and Beneficence for a
System of Principled Decision-Making in Long-Term Care, 41 EMORY L.J. 633, 668 (1992)
(noting that two sets of laws governing the durable power of attorney for health care
“represent two fundamentally different approaches to proxy decision-making. The Florida laws
are rooted in the principle of autonomy, while the principle of beneficence is central to the
English system.”); Sharona Hoffman, The Use of Placebos in Clinical Trials: Responsible
Research or Unethical Practice?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 449, 451 (2001) (“It is arguable that the
doctrine of beneficence militates against the inclusion of placebos in clinical trials under most if
not all circumstances. . . . By contrast, the doctrine of human autonomy might support
unrestricted use of placebo controls . . . . Arguably, patients, as autonomous, self-determining
agents, should be free to choose to participate in studies in which they might forgo treatment
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The legal recognition of autonomy as a value apart from bodily
integrity reinforces the dichotomy between the two already reflected
in the ethical literature on a physician’s duties to a patient. In The
Principles of Bioethics, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress identify
four principles that should direct medical practice: autonomy,
beneficence, non-malfeasance, and justice. 19 In considering these
values, the literature on informed consent has largely been directed
at the problem of what to do when these values come into conflict, 20
or at least to making the assertion that they may, at times,
be complimentary. 21
The famous fundamental maxim of the Hippocratic tradition in
medicine is primum non nocere: “above all, do no harm,” more
precisely formulated as “help, or at least do no harm.” 22 The central
demand of what it means to be a doctor, therefore, is the provision
of benefit beyond simply avoiding harm. 23 In the attempt to fulfill
this foundational duty, some physicians will accept a patient’s refusal
of treatment as valid, while others may ignore the fact that they have
not received informed consent and attempt to benefit the patient
through the medical intervention they deem appropriate. 24
Most legal and ethical theories of informed consent, however,
name “respect for autonomy” as the activating moral principle,
rooted in the liberal Western tradition of individual freedom over
“political life and personal development.” 25 This principle relates to
even at the risk of sacrificing their own health and welfare.”); Ken Marcus Gatter, Protecting
Patient-Doctor Discourse: Informed Consent and Deliberative Autonomy, 78 OR. L. REV. 941,
955 n.51 (1999) (“The Hippocratic Oath has meant different things to physicians practicing in
different times. Therefore, if the dominant ethic is beneficence, then physicians can use the
Hippocratic Oath to justify withholding information for the patient’s own good. In contrast,
under a dominant ethic of autonomy, a physician may interpret the Hippocratic Oath as
promoting the candid disclosure and discussion of information to patients.”).
19. BEAUCHAMP &CHILDRESS, supra note 17, at 12.
20. See supra note 18.
21. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Autonomy, Beneficence, and the Experimental Subject’s
Consent: A Response to Jay Katz, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 55, 60–61 (1993) (“To override, ignore
or coerce the patient’s autonomous wishes is to do harm to his dignity as a rational human
being. . . . [B]eneficence is the safeguard of autonomy as autonomy is the safeguard
of beneficence.”).
22. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 193–94 (1979);
JOHN D. HODSON, THE ETHICS OF LEGAL COERCION xiii (1983).
23. RUTH R. FADEN &TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 10 (1986).
24. Id. at 13.
25. Id. at 7. Faden and Beauchamp identify the principles relevant to informed consent
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such values as privacy, voluntariness, self-mastery, and the general
ability to choose and accept responsibility for the outcomes of one’s
choice. 26 As Ruth Faden and Tom Beauchamp note in their
comprehensive study of the relationship between autonomy and
informed consent, “autonomy has come to refer to personal selfgovernance: personal rule of the self by adequate understanding
while remaining free from controlling interferences by others and
from personal limitations that prevent choice.” 27 In the context of
informed consent, Faden and Beauchamp argue that a physician can
fail to respect autonomy in a number of ways, from intentionally
concealing medical information to refusing to recognize a patient’s
desire to forgo a particular course of treatment. 28 Autonomy is
controversial in its potential conflict with other values, such as public
health concerns and financial constraints, which are justified by
“some competing moral principle such as beneficence or justice.” 29
The legal debates over informed consent throughout the last
several decades have turned on the vindication of patient autonomy,
and in particular on autonomy as an emotional value from the
perspective of the patients. During the 1980s, for example, sixteen
states passed breast cancer informed consent laws after increasing
as respect for autonomy, beneficence, and justice. Id. See also King & Moulton, supra note 18,
at 436 (observing that “autonomy has been given substantial priority over the other ethical
principles, including beneficence” because “1) protecting autonomy is more easily aligned with
existing legal principles and precedents; 2) promoting patient autonomy may relieve the
physician of some responsibility and liability; 3) emphasizing patient autonomy coincides with
and supports with the recent shift toward consumerism in medicine; and 4) promoting
autonomy appears less paternalistic than beneficence, but still permits physicians to control the
flow of information”).
26. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 23, at 8.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 9. Faden and Beauchamp posit two different conceptions of informed consent:
“effective consent,” referring to following the legal and procedural requirements of obtaining a
patient’s formal permission, and “autonomous authorization,” premised upon the three criteria
of intentionality, understanding, and noncontrol (the third criterion compromised by
informational manipulation on the part of a physician). Id. at 238. Within this second
framework, informed consent does not merely facilitate autonomy; rather, the act of making an
autonomous authorization—even to the extent of ceding bodily autonomy—is autonomy in
and of itself. Id. Emerging from this model is the concern that efforts on the parts of physicians
directed purely to obtaining “effective consent” occlude consent in the second, more morally
significant form. Autonomy becomes a value to be advanced in its own right, not merely to
comply with the governing law, but because patients—already robbed by illness of much of
their opportunity to act autonomously, should be assisted by their doctors in doing so to the
greatest extent possible (or allowed to decide to cede autonomy if that is their choice).
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public outcry over the common practice of physicians performing
radical mastectomies without informing patients of the risks and
benefits of less invasive forms of treatment. 30 In her study of the role
of gender and emotion in the state congressional debates over this
legislation, Theresa Montini found that both proponents and
opponents shared the belief that women are more emotional than
men, and that this belief shaped the strategies developed by the
activists and contributed to their effectiveness. 31 As Montini noted,
one sponsoring legislator urged that an increased amount of
information be given to breast cancer patients as a partial antidote to
their terror: “The patient in whom a breast cancer diagnosis has been
made is a terribly frightened woman, frantic with anxiety, feeling
alone, forlorn and forsaken. Can a woman in such an emotional state
be adequately advised and informed on what is to happen if the
biopsy is unfavorable?” 32
Conversely, as Montini points out, “physician groups in
opposition to breast cancer informed consent argued that if the
legislation was passed, women would be too emotional to be able to
handle their choices.” 33 As one physician put it,
No matter how informed the patient is regarding treatment
modalities for the various tissue diagnoses of “breast cancer” and its
metastases, the choice of treatment can be colored by affect. If a
woman’s self-esteem is strongly tied to her body image,
assimilation of volumes of scientific research will not alter this fact
in her decision-making. 34

This view assumes that “affect” is a wholly separate category of
consideration from bodily well-being, and that autonomy, or
“choice,” is necessarily a threat to beneficence. In reality, this
dichotomy misses their interrelation. 35
In the first place, autonomy is not an entirely solitary value, but
is in fact socially embedded; our social interactions and our

30. Montini, supra note 4, at 9.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 16 (quoting Edythe C. Harrison & Lois Stovall-Hurdle, “A Woman Has an
Inherent Right.”, 109 VA. MED. 748 (1982)).
33. Montini, supra note 4, at 17.
34. Eloise Haun, The Unconscious Breast, 109 VA. MED. 750, 753 (1982).
35. This has the collateral consequence, at least in the breast cancer context, of
enshrining problematic gender stereotypes in legal and political discourse.
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relationships affect our autonomous decision-making processes. 36
Because relationships shape the exercise and experience of
autonomy, 37 it is incoherent to say that beneficence begins where
autonomy ends. The physician, through the provision of information
to the patient, inherently participates in his decision-making
autonomy. (The relational quality of patient autonomy is particularly
illustrated by the fact that patients with bad medical outcomes are
much less likely to sue if their physician apologizes to them for his
negligence.) 38 Likewise, as I will describe in Part III, the exercise of
autonomy can in and of itself have critical positive physical effects
and thus contribute to a physician’s seemingly separate duty
of beneficence.
To show how the blackletter law of informed consent has come
to miss this complex relationship, I will briefly describe the evolution
of informed consent doctrine.
B. Informed Consent from Battery to Negligence
Because an unwanted medical procedure inherently violates a
patient’s bodily integrity, early cases recognizing the physician’s legal
obligation to obtain consent sounded in battery rather than
negligence. Courts treated procedures performed without consent as
intentional, unwanted touchings. 39 In the foundational 1905 case
Mohr v. Williams, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a
surgeon’s game-time decision to operate on his patient’s left ear
violated the patient’s “right to himself,” which right prohibited
interference
with
the
bodily
integrity
of
a
patient
without permission. 40
About a decade later, in Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospitals, the New York Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge
36. Catriona MacKenzie, Imagining Oneself Otherwise, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY:
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF 126, 143 (Catriona
MacKenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000).
37. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF,
AUTONOMY AND LAW 279 (2011).
38. See, e.g., Benjamin Ho & Elaine Liu, Does Sorry Work? The Impact of Apology Laws
on Medical Malpractice, 43 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141, 163 (2011); Jennifer Robbennolt,
Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460 (2003);
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Medical Error, 467 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS &
RELATED RES. 376 (2009).
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 cmt. d, illus. 1 (1963–64).
40. 104 N.W. 12, 14–15 (Minn. 1905).
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Cardozo, provided an iconic statement about the relationship
between the receipt of informed consent by a doctor and the
potentially tortious or even criminal nature of treatment: “Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs
an operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault
. . . .” 41 Schloendorff made it clear that the cause of action under
battery was based upon the violation of the body itself, not upon any
particular physical injury arising from the unwanted touching. 42 In
that sense the cause of action served a punitive, rather than
compensatory, function.
Over the decades that followed, however, courts moved away
from the battery standard and its emphasis on bodily integrity
towards a negligence standard that conceptualized the failure to
provide information as interference with the more abstract value of
patient autonomy—but only in cases where bodily injury resulted. 43
Tort scholars have proposed several reasons to account for this shift.
They include: (1) the fact that battery allows for very few defenses;
(2) that judges preferred to base the legal standard on physician
practice rather than theory; (3) that a negligence standard permitted
judges to defer to the collective wisdom of the medical profession;
(4) that negligence law places a higher burden of proof on plaintiffs
and could therefore deter frivolous claims; and (5) that the tort of
battery has a criminal counterpart that could leave physicians
vulnerable to prosecution. 44 The new test had the further benefit of
shielding physicians from personal exposure to intentional tort
claims, which malpractice insurance does not generally cover. I
would characterize this shift away from battery as implicitly
recognizing that a physician’s choices about disclosure and treatment
advice implicate aspects of his own professional identity. Therefore
the rights of the physician as a legal person may come into tension
with the autonomous aspects of the patient’s personhood. The
physician, after all, must attempt to act in accordance with the full
range of his Hippocratic obligations, many of which require him to
make highly subjective judgments about the content of
“beneficence” in a particular case.
41.
42.
43.
44.
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Id.
See King & Moulton, supra note 18, at 434, 438–39.
See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 68–69 (2002).
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The 1957 California case Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University
Board of Trustees 45 provided one of the first coherent formulations of
the concern for a patient’s interest in self-determination, conceived
as a psychological need weighed against bodily welfare and the
related concern of causing unnecessary alarm by informing a patient
of highly remote risks of treatment. The doctor, the court said, must
“recognize that each patient presents a separate problem, that the
patient’s mental and emotional condition is important and in certain
cases may be crucial, and that in discussing the element of risk a
certain amount of discretion must be employed consistent with the
full disclosure of facts . . . .” 46 This language—contemplating both
the idiosyncratic preferences of the patient and the similarly variable
exercise of professional discretion on the part of the physician—
emphasizes the highly relational nature of the tort. In other words,
determining when the physician’s subjective interpretation of his
professional duty becomes legally subordinate to the particular
patient’s subjective needs requires consideration of the highly
personal relationship between the two parties.
In the years since Salgo, state statutory law on informed consent
has espoused, though unevenly, this concern for the free will of a
patient in decision-making and the honesty of the doctor in
providing information relevant to that decision. 47 Such concern has
been a twentieth-century phenomenon, reactive to a history in which
doctors’ authority to determine a course of treatment—and even to
withhold information from a patient about the severity of his
condition—had been paramount. 48 A number of social forces appear
responsible for this shift: the Civil Rights movement inaugurated an
era of “unwillingness to accede to the discretionary authority of
whites, men, husbands, parents, clinical investigators . . . and, of
course doctors. . . . Autonomy and consent became the bywords.” 49
Yet, even as courts have started to recognize that informed consent
implicates a patient’s unique psychological needs, by shifting away
45. 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
46. Id. at 181 (emphasis added).
47. See King & Moulton, supra note 18, at 439.
48. See Daniel K. Sokol, How the Doctor’s Nose Has Shortened Over Time; A Historical
Overview of the Truth-Telling Debate in the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 99 J. ROYAL SOC’Y
MED. 632, 633 (2006) (explaining the twentieth-century shift in candor towards patients). See
also Denis H. Novack et al., Physicians’ Attitudes Toward Using Deception to Resolve Difficult
Ethical Problems, 261 JAMA 2980, 2980 (1989).
49. KATZ, supra note 44, at 3.
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from a pure battery standard they have effectively narrowed the
circumstances under which these needs can be vindicated.
Under today’s malpractice law, a patient who seeks recovery for
having been treated with inadequate informed consent must prove
three elements: first, that the physician failed to disclose any risk in
the recommended treatment or the existence of any alternative
method of treatment; second, that the patient would have foregone
the recommended treatment had he or she known of the undisclosed
information; and, third, that as a result of the recommended
treatment the patient actually suffered an injury that would not have
occurred had the patient opted for one of the undisclosed methods
of treatment. 50 (An exception to this standard—which this article
does not challenge—is the rule that allows physicians to provide
treatment in the absence of informed consent in emergency
situations. 51) The most critical pragmatic difference between the
battery and negligence standards is that the latter, unlike the former,
depends on the existence of a physical injury.
Much of the scholarly debate over informed consent has centered
on the first prong of the informed consent test: specifically, on
whether the scope of a physician’s duty to disclose should be
measured by the standards of the medical community or of the
reasonable patient. 52 The states split down the middle between these
two standards, and the debate between them has generally focused
on how to balance beneficence and autonomy. 53 Twenty-five states
employ a “professional” or “physician-based” standard for informed
consent, meaning that a doctor is required to inform a patient of the
risks, benefits, and alternatives to a treatment in the manner that a
“reasonably prudent practitioner” would. 54 In twenty-three states
and the District of Columbia the standard is whether a physician has
provided the information on the risks, benefits, and alternatives that
a “reasonable patient” would deem material to making a decision

50. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
51. Id. at 788–89.
52. Compare Tashman v. Gibbs, 556 S.E.2d 772, 777 (Va. 2002), with Canterbury,
464 F.2d at 785.
53. For a summary of the laws of the various states, see King & Moulton, supra note 18,
at 493–501.
54. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960); see also Salgo v. Leland
Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Tashman, 556 S.E.2d
at 777.
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about treatment. 55 While some scholars laud the “reasonable
patient” standard for better protecting patient autonomy than does
its chief alternative, as I will discuss next in Part III, neither standard
accurately captures the nature of the harm to personhood at stake in
an informed consent case, or the effects of knowledge on a patient’s
bodily wellbeing.
III. THE INADEQUACY OF THE INJURY STANDARD
The decision of courts to move informed consent doctrine into
the realm of negligence was a compromise designed to fix, for good
reason, some limits on physician liability. Yet it cannot account for
the basic fact that led courts to recognize non-consensual treatment
as a battery in the first place: a victim of an unwanted touching has
had his body violated regardless of the “reasonableness” of his
reasons for not wanting it. Furthermore, the negligence regime only
allows for recovery in cases where an “injury” has occurred,
precluding claims by patients whose “only” injury was a medical
procedure, however invasive, with a medically acceptable outcome.
In this section I will argue that, regardless of whether the operative
standard of duty is physician-based or “reasonable patient”-based,
the negligence test for informed consent leaves many patients
without remedy for physical injuries.
Early informed consent cases focusing on bodily violation as the
core wrong seem to grasp that a patient who agrees to a procedure
he would not have undergone had he been informed, or better
informed, has been wronged per se, regardless of how successful the
procedure was on its own terms. 56 And it certainly stands to reason
that, if gently touching someone, with good intentions and to no
detrimental physical effect, is a non-controversial example of a
battery, how much more invasive is a surgery, which potentially
restrains the patient’s movements for weeks or months, interrupts
her professional and personal commitments, and is frequently
accompanied by substantial physical pain and unpleasant aesthetic
costs such as scarring? These effects result from even the most
55. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 784 (“Respect for the patient’s right of self-determination
on particular therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one which
physicians may or may not impose upon themselves.”); see also King & Moulton, supra note
18, at 493–501.
56. For a discussion of the early cases treated as torts in battery, see Milton Oppenheim,
Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 11 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 249, 253–54 (1962).
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successful procedures, and yet all necessitate a dramatically greater
degree of violence to the patient’s body than gentle touching.
Yet, by embracing the negligence standard for informed consent,
courts have been understandably reluctant to hold doctors liable for
good faith actions undertaken for the patient’s benefit. 57 As noted
above, the physician’s own legal identity with its accompanying duty
of beneficence is implicated in this trade-off. Just as a patient’s
subjective experience may be relevant to the scope of injury, a
physician’s subjective judgment may be relevant to the execution of
his duty. Furthermore, because malpractice insurance generally does
not cover intentional torts, a battery standard would leave physicians
personally on the hook for the full extent of their liability in
such cases. 58
Yet these motivations are arguably insufficient to deny recovery
for an act properly understood as a battery. As Grant Morris puts it,
“The absence of hostile intent or malicious motive, the absence of an
intent to injure, or the existence of the defendant’s good faith in
making the contact does not preclude the imposition of intentional
tort liability.” 59 He further asks whether a “victim [should] be
denied compensation because the wrongdoer must pay the judgment
out of his or her own pocket instead of out of the pockets of
innocent insurance policyholders” and concludes that “[i]f anything,
a requirement that wrongdoers pay directly instead of spreading the
loss through insurance better assures that in the future they . . . will
conform their conduct to the law’s requirements.” 60 While Morris’s
position seems intuitively just on its own terms, it is even more
compelling if one drills deeper into the nature of the harm redressed
by informed consent laws and the elements of the negligence test
itself. Ultimately, I suggest that the current limited definition of
injury is insufficient for three reasons: the standard ignores the latest
medical understandings, devalues subjectivity as part of a legal
wrong, and distorts the doctor-patient relationship.

57. See Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297, 313 (Wis. 1973).
58. See, e.g., Clayburn v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 871 N.Y.S.2d 487, 488–89
(App. Div. 2009); Baldinger v. Consol. Mut. Ins. Co., 222 N.Y.S.2d 736, 737–38 (App. Div.
1961), aff’d, 183 N.E.2d 908 (N.Y. 1962).
59. Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARIZ. L. REV.
313, 320 (2002).
60. Id. at 322.
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A. The Standard Ignores the Latest Medical Understandings

As discussed above, the battery view of informed consent
doctrine recognized the dignitary nature of the tort inflicted by a
physician who overrides his patient’s autonomy by performing a
procedure with inadequate information. The requirement of physical
injury imposed by the newer negligence standard would seem to
remove dignitary harms to a patient’s personhood from the realm of
compensable injuries. In this section, I will demonstrate how
dignitary harms to a patient’s body do, in and of themselves, cause
physical injury. By persisting in a dichotomy between “autonomy”
and “beneficence,” scholars have failed to perceive a class of physical
harms for which there is currently no compensation available.
1. The empirical case for the “body self”
Several areas of medical research show how the brain acts as the
body’s first line of defense against illness. Due to the nature of the
mind-body connection, changes in thought and belief systems that
occur in the brain can result in positive or negative changes to the
body. 61 The medical community has become increasingly aware of
these interactions in recent years. As psychologist Oakley Ray notes,
“[t]his new approach to health says loudly and clearly that the
causes, development, and outcomes of an illness are determined by
the interaction of psychological, social, and cultural factors with
biochemistry and physiology.” 62 Ray explains that our beliefs
influence the biology of our bodies and that beliefs and ideas—
regardless of whether real or imaginary—cause bodily responses. 63
Neuropsychiatrist Eric Kandel identified the mechanism through
which belief impacts biology: “the regulation of gene expression by
social factors makes all bodily functions, including all functions of
the brain, susceptible to social influence.” 64 For example, the
distinctly physiological harms caused by stress (or, to use the
technical term, “allostatic load”) are experienced “when there is an
inadequate match between an individual’s coping skills and the
61. Oakley Ray, How the Mind Hurts and Heals the Body, 59 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 29,
29 (2004).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 32.
64. Eric Kandel, A New Intellectual Framework for Psychiatry, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
457, 461 (1998).
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environmental demands that the individual believes these skills
must confront.” 65
Likewise, a number of studies have demonstrated the effects of
certain kinds of patient narratives on significant illnesses, such as
cancer. One study found that a breast cancer patient’s likelihood of
mortality or recurrence of the disease was better predicted by her
mental attitude three months after surgery than by other “physical”
factors such as her age, the size of her tumor, or the tumor’s
histologic grade. 66 Women who displayed attitudes characterized as
“fighting spirit” (the idea that she was going to beat the disease) or
“denial” (the belief that the mastectomy had only been a precaution)
had a 50% chance of surviving for fifteen years in good health, as
opposed to 15% amongst women with attitudes of “stoic
acceptance,” “hopelessness,” and “anxious preoccupation.” 67 A
subsequent study found that the emotional quality of “helplessness”
amongst breast cancer patients was linked to mortality: “Patients
who had a high score on the helpless measure . . . were more likely
to have relapsed or died during the 5 years” of the study. 68 If we
consider the importance of narrative to coping, which I will discuss
in the next sub-section, it becomes apparent how neglect of these
subjective experiences can translate directly into physical harm. 69
Furthermore, as Ray has also stressed, the role of knowledge is
crucial to the development of coping skills:
The more an individual knows about the surrounding world, the
more that person is able to understand, control, and deal effectively
with it. . . . With knowledge, information, comes an empowerment,
a belief that the world is understandable, controllable, and friendly.
Perhaps the most stressful situation is the ambiguity that comes

65. Ray, supra note 61, at 32.
66. S. Greer, Psychological Response to Cancer and Survival, 21 PSYCHOL. MED. 43,
43 (1991).
67. Id.
68. M. Watson et al., Influence of Psychological Response on Survival in Breast Cancer: A
Population-Based Cohort Study, 354 LANCET 1331, 1335 (1999).
69. A number of studies have demonstrated the relationship between stress and
infection. See, e.g., Sheldon Cohen et al., Negative Life Events, Perceived Stress, Negative Affect,
and Susceptibility to the Common Cold, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 131 (1993);
Sheldon Cohen, Psychological Stress, Immunity, and Upper Respiratory Infections, 5 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 86 (1996); Bahi Takkouche et al., A Cohort Study of Stress and the
Common Cold, 12 EPIDEMIOLOGY 345 (2001).

80

DO NOT DELETE

63

11/18/2015 2:12 PM

Rethinking Injury: The Case of Informed Consent
from
an
awareness
that
incomplete information. 70

one

has

inadequate

and

Ronny Frishman has concluded that patients who exerted “more
control” during visits to the doctor had improved health over those
who did not. 71 Ashis body of research has begun to create a new
understanding of the general relationship between physical health
and mental attitudes about health, so has the burgeoning school of
thought known as “narrative medicine” begun to look at what
specific narratives patients tell about their illnesses and how their
interactions with their doctors could affect these narratives. 72
2. Narrative control as a component of bodily well-being
Research into the way patients use narrative to manage the
physical effects of their illness has provided a more nuanced
understanding of the importance of a patient’s subjective
interpretation of his suffering to the process of healing. 73 In The
70. Ray, supra note 61, at 33. Ray goes on to note the linear relationship between an
increase in years of education and a decline in mortality rate. Id. (citing Theodore Pincus et al.,
Social Conditions and Self-Management Are More Powerful Determinants of Health than Access
to Care, 129 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 406 (1998)).
71. Ronny Frishman, Quality of Care: Don’t Be a Wimp in the Doctor’s Office, 21 HARV.
HEALTH LETTER 1, 1–2 (1996).
72. Broadly speaking, “narrative medicine” describes the practice of medicine with the
narrative competence to recognize, absorb, interpret, and be moved by the stories of illness, a
movement arising in part to combat the accusation that a doctor’s capacity to empathize with
and respect the suffering of his patient and to attend to the patient’s individual account of his
illness actually diminishes with medical training. RITA CHARON, NARRATIVE MEDICINE:
HONORING THE STORIES OF ILLNESS 3, 8 (2006) [hereinafter CHARON, STORIES OF ILLNESS]
(citing JODI HALPERN, FROM DETACHED CONCERN TO EMPATHY: HUMANIZING MEDICAL
PRACTICE (2001)). A 1984 study, for example, found that the average amount of time
between the opening of an interview with a patient and the doctor’s first interruption was 18
seconds. Howard B. Beckman & Richard M. Frankel, The Effect of Physician Behavior on the
Collection of Data, 101 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 692, 694 (1984). Degree programs such as
the Program in Narrative Medicine at the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Columbia
University endeavor to bring the lessons of literary scholarship, psychology, and anthropology
to bear upon the practice of medicine: namely, that “[u]sing narrative knowledge enables a
person to understand the plight of another by participating in his or her story with complex
skills of imagination, interpretation, and recognition.” CHARON, STORIES OF ILLNESS, supra,
at 9–10.
73. There is, it should be noted, much to be gained by the physician, in addition to the
patient, from recognizing patient subjectivity when recommending treatment. Rita Charon has
written about the increasingly adverse relationship between doctor and patient resulting from
the rise of often legally trained bioethicists whose mediation of the relationship has been a
result of the postmodern, autonomy-focused approach to patients’ rights. CHARON, STORIES
OF ILLNESS, supra note 72, at 205. To solve this problem, she proposes an inter-subjective
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Wounded Storyteller, sociologist Arthur Frank begins his account of
the relationship between illness and storytelling with the insight that
at the heart of illness is a fundamental loss of bodily control and that
ill people have widely differing abilities to adapt to this crisis of
control. 74 As Frank notes “[a] body’s place on the continuum of
control depends not only on the physiological possibility of
predictability or contingency, but also on how the person chooses to
interpret this physiology.” 75 Frank utilizes the concept of individuals
as hybrid “body-selves.” 76 In this view, an ill person’s well-being is,
in part, the product of his undeniable physical loss of control and his
psychological willingness to accept this loss of control. 77
Frank goes on to describe the role of storytelling in repairing the
damage to the body-self caused by the assault of illness: “Stories have
to repair the damage that illness has done to the ill person’s sense of
where she is in life, and where she may be going. Stories are a way of
redrawing maps and finding new destinations.” 78 For Frank,
narratives allow a sufferer to attempt to repair the interruption to self
caused by illness and to find a way to integrate his potentially
diminished bodily state into a new subjective identity moving

dialogue in which both patient and physician transcend the limitations of the traditional clinical
relationship. For Charon, “narrative medicine provides the means to understand the personal
connections between patient and physician” as well as “the meaning of medical practice for the
individual physician.” Rita Charon, Narrative Medicine: A Model for Empathy, Reflection,
Profession, and Trust, 286 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1897, 1897 (2001). Charon seems to conclude
that through narrative exchange with patients, a physician may contribute to the development
of ethical imperatives without the necessity of a mediating legal framework: “The ethicality of
narrative medicine . . . emerges directly and organically from its practice and need not have a
separate ‘bioethics’ function appended to it.” CHARON, STORIES OF ILLNESS, supra note 72, at
210. This call for attention to and participation in the subjective meanings a patient assigns to
illness and treatment is, of course, crucial—if done well it could address the vast majority of the
concerns I have raised in the first part of this paper. Until such attention becomes an
established feature of the medical community, however, it cannot replace the need for
subjective accountability in our legal treatment of malpractice claims. Furthermore, as doctors
who are sued for malpractice in the first place are disproportionately those described as
inattentive to patients’ voices, the burdens of a patient-centered standard would fall largely on
the shoulders of those most deserving it, and those least likely to become willing participants in
the sort of practice Charon advocates. MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF
THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 43 (2005).
74. ARTHUR FRANK, THE WOUNDED STORYTELLER: BODY, ILLNESS, AND ETHICS
30 (1995).
75. Id. at 32.
76. Id. at 28–29.
77. Id. at 30.
78. Id. at 53.
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forward. Frank has identified three major types of narratives patients
commonly use to organize their experiences of illness, noting that
most people will use more than just one, though to varying degrees.
The first, most common, is the “restitution narrative,” which has
the storyline: “Yesterday I was healthy, today I’m sick, but tomorrow
I’ll be healthy again.” 79 This narrative centers on the importance of
health being restored and the interruption to a patient’s life
completely reversed. Frank asserts that modern medicine is
preoccupied with the restitution narrative, obsessed with finding
“cures” even when none exist. 80 As a result, treatment can proceed
indefinitely at the expense of allowing a sufferer to cease being a
patient and simply “find her way toward her own version of a
good death.” 81
The second narrative, the “chaos narrative,” can be better
described as an “anti-narrative”: “In these stories the modernist
bulwark of remedy, progress, and professionalism cracks to reveal
vulnerability, futility, and impotence.” 82 In the chaos narrative,
illness can only be experienced as immediacy, without the possibility
for narrative reflection. 83 Furthermore, as Frank notes, “People living
these stories regularly accuse medicine of seeking to maintain its
pretense of control—its restitution narrative—at the expense of
denying the suffering of what it cannot treat.” 84
In the third narrative, the “quest narrative,” ill storytellers “meet
suffering head on; they accept illness and seek to use it. Illness is the
occasion of a journey that becomes a quest.” 85 The distinguishing
feature of a quest narrative is the centrality of the teller, as opposed
to the remedy (as in restitution) or the disease (as in chaos). 86
79. Id. at 77.
80. Id. at 83.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 97.
83. Id. at 99.
84. Id. at 100.
85. Id. at 115.
86. As an example of the ethic of recollection, Frank cites author Audre Lorde’s
narrative of her experiences post-mastectomy, when a nurse disapproved of her failure to wear
a prosthetic breast, asking that she wear one at least when she came in for appointments out of
concern for “the morale of the office.” Id. at 121. Lorde describes this remark, to which she
was initially too distressed to respond, as “only the first such assault on my right to define and
claim my own body,” id., and Frank describes Lorde’s subsequent re-telling as an ethical
action, lying in “her willingness to recollect that failure [to respond] and offer it to others with
an indication of what should have been done.” Id. at 132. Lorde’s account of her conversation
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Furthermore, because this narrative is a “self-story,” it becomes
communicative and therefore endowed with outward-looking
possibilities, which Frank identifies as “recollection,” “solidarity,”
and “inspiration.” 87
To apply these insights to a specific legal example, consider Mohr
v. Williams, in which a patient complaining of trouble in her right
ear consented to a tympanoplasty (the patching of a perforated ear
drum) and removal of a diseased polyp in her middle ear. 88 Once the
patient was unconscious, the physician examined both ears again and
discovered that the drum of the left ear, which had not been
bothering her, was likewise perforated. In the physician’s estimation,
it needed the surgery more than the right one did which, upon
closer examination, did not appear as serious as he had previously
thought. 89 He, therefore, performed surgery on the left ear. 90 When
the patient regained consciousness, she found she had suffered
substantial hearing loss in the left ear, for which she sued the
physician. 91 The case, decided in the patient’s favor, has become
known for its holding that, in the absence of a life-threatening
emergency, consent to surgery on one organ does not constitute
consent to surgery on another. Therefore, even if the hearing loss
with the nurse underscores the relationship between the assault of a disease on a “body-self”
and the assaultive qualities of its treatment. Unlike a disease, a purveyor of treatment possesses
intentionality—usually the intention to cause what would otherwise be offensive bodily contact
were it not for the motive of increasing, rather than decreasing, overall health. But what about
such statements as the one made by Lorde’s nurse? The nurse clearly exerted no physical
control over Lorde, but Lorde experienced her words as an assault, not due to any fear of
physical jeopardy but due to the nurse’s representation of the restitution narrative enforced by
the medical profession itself and embodied by the doctor’s office. According to this narrative,
Lorde should wear a prosthetic because doing so would bring her closer to the medical
conception of “whole” even if it is at the expense of her own agency and self-identity, which
were better served, from her perspective, by the quest narrative she was attempting to devise
(one of reclaiming her new body as an integrated identity). That Lorde remained silent yet
deeply traumatized by what, for her, was a self-destroying narrative of her illness demonstrates
how the profession’s imposition of a view of illness inconsistent with a patient’s narrative of self
can have an assaultive quality in its action upon personhood. A physician can, therefore,
through presenting treatment options without regard to more subjectively appropriate
alternatives, propose offensive bodily contact under what we should consider to be a false
assumption of consent, in part because professional medicine may at times attempt to dictate
the overall terms by which a self may exist in the first place.
87. Id. at 132–33.
88. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 13 (Minn. 1905).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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would have been a foreseeable and non-actionable risk of the surgery
itself, the patient could recover damages in the absence of consent. 92
We can better understand the Mohr plaintiff’s legal experience by
thinking of it as a narrative experience: the patient recognized herself
as unwell and sought a “cure” to restore herself to a state of
healthiness. Upon waking, however, she found herself deaf in an ear
she had not even identified as unhealthy. Regardless of whether it
made good medical sense ex ante to perform the surgery, the doctor
had turned the patient’s subjective experience into a chaos narrative
by asserting arbitrary physical control over her. Rendered silent by
anesthesia (and potentially the gender norms of the time period) as
to the course of treatment for that part of her body, she found
herself disabled in a manner impossible to reconcile with the
restitution narrative covering the course of treatment for the
originally ailing ear.
The facts of the case raise further questions than those legally
relevant to its holding as to damages for the left ear. As the court
noted, the patient had been so frightened of being put under general
anesthesia that the surgeon had asked for her family’s general
practitioner to attend the surgery “under the impression that it
would allay and calm her fears.” 93 (The general practitioner was not
authorized by the patient to make decisions on her behalf while she
was unconscious, but his “assent” to the proposed surgery on the left
ear was cited by the defense as evidence of the patient’s implied
consent.) 94 Furthermore, the doctor determined the supposed nonseriousness of the right ear’s condition with the same visual
examination he had performed while the patient was still conscious.
These facts at least hint at a question unrelated to the surgery on the
left ear: How necessary was the surgery on the right ear (which the
patient never subsequently underwent) weighed against the trauma
of undergoing anesthesia and surrendering bodily autonomy to a
roomful of strangers? In other words, even if the treatment for the
proposed ear had unfolded as anticipated by the patient, would it
have been a false restitution narrative told by the patient’s physicians
to encourage her consent, masking the underlying chaos of the
treatment itself? This could well be the case if the proposed

92. Id. at 15.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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treatment was both traumatic enough to be so noted by the
Minnesota Supreme Court and yet so little necessary as to have been
abandoned by the physician altogether. In other words, even if
successful, the treatment itself might have been a grosser
interruption of the patient’s bodily well-being than were the original
ear pains.
From today’s medical standpoint, there is almost no way to
adequately evaluate the patient’s choices in 1905. A tympanoplasty is
performed to restore hearing and to reduce the risk of infection
posed by a perforated eardrum. The actual odds of infection
occurring are difficult to quantify and largely dependent upon the
patient’s care of the damaged ear. 95 (The Mohr plaintiff may have
undergone the more invasive mastoidectomy, in which an infected
portion of the mastoid bone is removed.) 96 It is further impossible to
tell from a judicial opinion just how disruptive even a successful
operation would have been to the specific patient’s life and
construction of self. It is worth noting that a large number of
contemporary patients commenting on a message board for those in
recovery from tympanoplasty and mastoidectomy report, months out
from the surgery, that they would not have undergone the procedure
had they known how long it would result in greater hearing loss,
how difficult to predict the odds of recovering hearing actually were,
and the duration of the interruption to their professional and
personal lives and efforts at physical fitness. 97 The range of responses
95. Nat’l
Inst.
of
Health,
Ruptured
Eardrum,
MEDLINE
PLUS,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001038.htm
(last
updated
May
18, 2014).
PLUS,
96. Nat’l
Inst.
of
Health,
Mastoidectomy,
MEDLINE
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/003016.htm
(last
updated
Aug.
30, 2012).
97. For example: “Now I continue to lead my life with blocking sensation and mild ear
[sic] loss in affected ear. . . . They also conclude since I am diabetic type 2 it has not healed in
my case so my question is why do surgery in the first place.” Manjunath Varadaraj, Comment
to My Tympanoplasty, A Retrospective, RICKY MONDELLO: LIFE ENTHUSIAST (Apr. 18, 2011,
12:22 AM), http://rmondello.com/2008/08/23/my-tympanoplasty-a-retrospective. “[I]
think getting the surgery was the worst decision i’ve [sic] ever made in my life. my[sic] hearing
waz [sic] perfect on both sides but my ear discharged [sic] a yellow liquid but when it dried up
I [sic] could still hear very clearly. the [sic] doctor said if i didnt [sic] get the surgery then an
infection could affect it going into my brain. well [sic] now I [sic] had the surgery & ma [sic]
left ear is not perfect like before but its [sic] still ok.” Femi, Comment to My Tympanoplasty, A
Retrospective, RICKY MONDELLO: LIFE ENTHUSIAST (Apr. 13, 2009, 9:11PM),
http://rmondello.com/2008/08/23/my-tympanoplasty-a-retrospective. “Its [sic] hard for
me not to be active . . . . I just want to be able to return to jogging and swimming. I don’t feel
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to this surgery make it clear that whether a procedure secures or
precludes “restitution” or “chaos” varies dramatically from patient
to patient.
The weight of this research urges one obvious conclusion: a
patient may have a wide range of highly subjective reasons for
accepting or refusing a particular procedure, depending in part on
his unique approach to his illness and healing. When a physician
withholds information, she prevents her patient from making the
best decision consistent with his particular illness narrative. Because
of the connection between the mind and body and the role of illness
narratives in physical healing, the physician has thereby imposed a
physical injury.
B. The Negligence Standard Devalues Subjectivity as Part of a Legal
Wrong
While the discussion of narrative medicine in the preceding
section may have made it clear that some harm occurs when a doctor
performs a procedure with inadequate consent, it does not
necessarily follow that such harm may be recoverable as a tort. Now
that we understand the physiological mechanisms at work from the
perspective of the patient, the question becomes whether the
resulting injury is of the sort properly redressed by the tort system.
In this section I will first use a civil recourse framework to argue that
an informed consent violation is indeed such an injury and, in light
of certain relational qualities, an injury particularly appropriate for
like that day will ever come.” Berm, Comment to My Tympanoplasty, A Retrospective, RICKY
MONDELLO:
LIFE
ENTHUSIAST
(July
21,
2009
11:51
PM),
http://rmondello.com/2008/08/23/my-tympanoplasty-a-retrospective. “Now I understand
that the 97 to 98% success rate means they can restore some kind of hearing with the surgery.
Tests show that I have restored about 25% of my hearing at 4 feet. Past that everything is very
distorted . . . . That is one thing that I have noticed about this surgery, there is a lot of not
really sure and have no idea about the results [sic]. It sure was a lot of discomfort and pain for
the end result.” Billy Bagby, Comment to My Tympanoplasty, A Retrospective, RICKY
MONDELLO: LIFE ENTHUSIAST (July 25, 2009, 7:44 PM), http://rmondello.com
/2008/08/23/my-tympanoplasty-a-retrospective. It is interesting to contrast these chaotic
narratives with the quest and restitution narratives of other posters to the site, including its
creator who conveys both a restitution conception of his treatment and the ethical imperative
and sharing characteristic of a quest narrative: “I retell this story now because it’s time to wrap
it up. It’s been six months since the procedure and everything is well. I can bathe and swim
without an ear plug and my hearing is much better, although not perfect. Although recovery
was painful and tedious at times, I regret nothing . . . .” Ricky Mondello, My Tympanoplasty, A
MONDELLO:
LIFE
ENTHUSIAST
(Aug.
23,
2008).”
Retrospective,
RICKY
http://rmondello.com/2008/08/23/my-tympanoplasty-a-retrospective.
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remedy in tort consistent with the rest of the law. I will then step
back to consider how the expressive function of tort law,
underplayed in civil recourse analysis, is compromised by the
inconsistent treatment of victim subjectivity in constructing
legal wrongs.
1. Ignoring patient subjectivity is inconsistent with the definition of
injury in related torts
This Article began with the basic problem that tort theorists have
generally clashed about whether tort law should be understood
conceptually as law for allocating the costs of accidents or law about
private “wrongs.” 98 Over the last hundred years, the dominant view
has been of tort law as a system for shifting losses to achieve policy
objectives. In his well-known treatise, William L. Prosser concluded
that the purpose of a tort action is to “compensate [the injured
party] for the damage he has suffered, at the expense of the
wrongdoer.” 99 In the 1960s, as automobile use expanded, an
increasing concern with car accidents entrenched this conception.
Most great tort thinkers of the last half of the twentieth century
adopted some version of it. 100 Modern tort scholarship has seen the
efforts by corrective justice theorists to apply principles of moral
responsibility to the question of when a loss should be

98. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 918.
99. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 10 (1941). See
also 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, § 25.1 at 490, 493 (2d ed., 1986)
(“The cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-American law is that of compensation for the
injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant’s breach of duty” through “repairing plaintiff’s
injury or . . . making him whole as nearly as that may be done by an award of money”).
Goldberg has explored the historical development of this notion of compensation as key to tort
recovery and noted that, far from deriving from time immemorial, it was a departure from
eighteenth and nineteenth understandings of tort claimants often being entitled to greater or
lesser awards than required for perfect compensation. John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of
Tort Damages: Fair Versus Full Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 436–38 (2006).
100. See, e.g., FLEMING, supra note 1, at 1 (stating that “the economic cost of accidents
represents a constant and mounting drain on the community’s human and material resources”
and that the “task of the law of torts is to play an important regulatory role in the adjustment
of these losses and the eventual allocation of their cost”); ATIYAH, supra note 1, at 239
(describing tort law as primarily the rules governing compensation for “road accidents and
industrial accidents”); CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 312 (1970) (arguing that the costs of
accidents can be reduced by assigning them to the least cost avoider).
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shifted. 101Conversely, Judge Richard A. Posner has advanced an
account of efficient-deterrence, in which the overarching project of
tort is the most efficient use of resources overall. 102
Yet tort law is increasingly expanding into areas of wrongful
injury that cannot be properly understood as loss compensation,
including 10b-5 suits, civil RICO actions, workplace discrimination,
constitutional torts, and intellectual property infringement. 103 Civil
recourse theorists John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky have
challenged the loss allocative view of torts by advancing a model of
tort law as a system of recourse for private wrongs. 104 They identify
four primary challenges to the notion of torts as wrongs, all of which
help us better conceptualize the violation of informed consent as
a tort. 105
First, in grappling with whether a tort should be understood as a
moral or a legal wrong, Goldberg and Zipurksy note that while
moral rules and legal rules are both, on their own terms, “duty
imposing,” a legal rule does not have authority because it is morally
sound but because it creates a legal directive. 106 Although many torts
are in fact moral wrongs, to claim that an action is a tort is not to
claim that it has violated a moral duty but rather a legal duty. 107 For
example, a person who goes onto someone’s property while
reasonably believing it to be his own, and commits no damage while
he is there, cannot be said to have committed any moral wrong, but
is nonetheless guilty of the legal wrong of trespass. Similarly, while a
physician may be attempting to act morally, in accordance with his
duty of beneficence, he may nonetheless violate an affirmative duty
of disclosure and thereby commit a legal wrong against his patient.
This is so regardless of the nature of the resulting physical effects.
Second, in response to the argument that a tort cannot be a
wrong if it is not formally “punished,” Goldberg and Zipursky assert
that torts-as-wrongs are different from crimes insofar as they
101. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN,
EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 48–58 (1999); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of
Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151–52 (1973).
102. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 16–17(1987).
103. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 919.
104. See generally id.
105. Id. at 929–30.
106. Id. at 948–49.
107. Id. at 950.
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represent violations of relational, rather than simple legal
directives. 108 Whereas a criminal prohibition states “For all x, x shall
not A,” a tort occurs when someone violates the directive “For all x
and for all y, x shall not do A to y.” 109 While the criminal justice
system exists to vindicate the wrongs of society for violations of the
first type, “the tort system provides a system of civil recourse for
victims against those who have committed relational wrongs against
them.” 110 The heightened relational component of an informed
consent tort—based, as it is, upon the asymmetry in knowledge
about the body as between the doctor and patient—shows how the
wrong truly at issue should not be defined by the manner of physical
injury resulting from it.
Third, Goldberg and Zipursky acknowledge the seeming
problem of “moral luck”—the fact that the same wrong conduct
might result in injuries in some cases and not others. 111 They resolve
this problem by relying on the tort victim’s subjective experience of a
wrong. “[F]rom the plaintiff’s perspective, it is not correct to say
that there just happens to have been a conjunction of her loss and
wrongful conduct by the defendant: In her eyes the defendant’s
wrong is mistreating her or interfering with some aspect of her wellbeing.” 112 Embedded in the wrongs-based conception of tort, then,
is the individual victim’s account of his harm—part of the definition
of a wrong is that a victim perceives it as such. This subjective
account matters less if we conceive of torts as the law of
compensation, but becomes quite important to the wrongsbased conception.
Finally, in response to the criticism of torts as a “hodgepodge” of
unrelated types of claims, Goldberg and Zipursky note that tort law
can be understood to vindicate the interference with any of a
number of interests, including those of bodily integrity and personal
space. 113 Again, the “interference” component of an informed
consent violation has taken place at the moment the procedure has
been performed, not the point at which a subsequent physical
injury arises.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
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Id. at 946.
Id. at 942.
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Nonetheless, the assumption of tort law—as distinct from
criminal law—is that an injury must occur in order for a claim to
lie. 114 Due, in fact, to the relational quality of a tort wrong, a
recognizable tort must also have a temporal component. Specifically,
a plaintiff in a tort case must have what Zipursky calls “substantive
standing;” inherent in the tort itself is the fact that the plaintiff must
be the one injured by the defendant’s misconduct. 115 As a result, the
tort must also be “realized”—if the tort has only been attempted, a
plaintiff cannot be injured and therefore have standing. 116 (In
contrast, the state can prosecute a criminal attempt without the
requirement of a victim.)
In the case of informed consent, it is, of course, fairly obvious
that the patient is the party harmed by the physician’s breach of
duty. The patient has clearly undergone some form of medical
procedure he would not have wanted if he had had more knowledge.
Indeed the relational component is heightened by virtue of the
physician’s heightened duty to respect his patient’s autonomy
through the affirmative requirements of providing information. In
other words, while a layperson has a duty to take care not to injure
another party, a physician has a duty to make specific disclosures to
protect the patient’s autonomy.
Yet the criterion of realization looks, at first blush, to cut against
the recognition of a broader category of harm in these cases. The
evidence from narrative medicine shows us that a patient’s lack of
control over his illness narrative causes a range of physiological
symptoms. However, due to the difficulty in measuring them in an
individual case, when compared to a counterfactual in which the
patient did not undergo the procedure, there appears to be an
evidentiary bar to meeting the realization prong.
Turning again to civil recourse theory, however, it becomes clear
that these cases of informed consent have kinship to the particular,
narrow category of so-called inchoate torts, which are well
recognized in several contexts already. Take, for example, the “loss
of chance” cases, in which the plaintiff can prove that he suffered
harm but has evidentiary challenges in proving causation. The
doctrine became recognized in suits brought by the survivors of
114. See Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 262 (1996).
115. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Substantive Standing, Civil Recourse, and Corrective
Justice, 39 FLA. ST. L. REV. 299, 304 (2011).
116. Id.

91

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/18/2015 2:12 PM

2015

sailors lost at sea on ships with insufficient rescue devices. 117 In such
cases, it was impossible to show that, had the rescue devices been
adequate, the sailors would in fact have been saved, but because
courts recognized that the sailors had been injured by the inability to
be saved at all, they allowed the cause of action. 118
This doctrine has spread more recently into the realm of
malpractice to provide a remedy in cases where a physician
negligently fails to diagnose a patient’s progressive disease until after
the point at which there is any hope for a cure. 119 In such cases, the
physician’s duty has been reconceptualized from a duty to do no
harm to a duty not to diminish a patient’s chance of survival. 120 In
recognizing these claims, however, courts have required that two
criteria be met: 121 First, that the plaintiffs have demonstrably suffered
losses but have problems proving causation. 122 And second, that the
defendant has an existing affirmative duty to assist or protect, as
opposed to merely refraining from injurious conduct. 123
Because a physician has an affirmative duty to provide enough
information to respect a patient’s autonomy, the case of informed
consent is analogous to these inchoate torts, and even stronger. If a
physician has performed a procedure non-negligently, such that
there are no obvious bad health outcomes from the procedure itself,
it is pragmatically difficult for a plaintiff to prove that he would have
forgone it. Thus, whatever long-term physiological effects
accompany the overriding of his illness narrative, they are difficult to
trace to the doctor’s withholding of information. And, of course, as
in the lost chance context, the physician has an affirmative duty. The
plaintiff is injured through the physician’s failure to respect his
autonomy, and the limitation on the definition of injury in the
current law is inconsistent with this understanding elsewhere.
The lesson emerging from the foregoing discussion most
applicable to informed consent is that in cases where a defendant has

117. See Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 75–
77 (1956).
118. Id.
119. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 178 at 434–35 (2000).
120. Id.
121. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV.
1625, 1657–58 (2002).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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clearly breached a heightened duty to a plaintiff, who nonetheless
has difficulty proving a chain of causation, the law will recognize an
“inchoate” tort as a formal legal wrong for the purposes of providing
redress. In these informed consent cases it is indisputable that a
subjective wrong has occurred; allowing redress for it without
requiring an explicit connection to its physiological pathway would
be most consistent with the current treatment of the most closely
related torts.
2. Ignoring subjectivity undermines the legitimacy of the tort system
Thus far this article has been limited to discussion of the physical
harm suffered by an individual patient as a result of a physician
overriding the patient’s subjective preferences, and the nature of the
legal wrong that should arise from it. Civil recourse theory has aided
us here; but, in its focus on the nature of the wrong suffered by an
individual, the theory gives shorter shrift to how the outwardly
expressive function of the law itself validates individual subjectivity in
a way that cannot be discounted. The theory of relational autonomy
suggests that the individual exercise of medical decision-making may
be inflected and shaped by external forces and one of those is the law
itself, in its recognition of personhood. 124 In this section I will
examine the ways through which our existing legal systems for
vindicating wrong serve expressive functions and the ways in which
those functions derive legitimacy from the recognition and validation
of victims’ subjective harm.
It is more common, and perhaps more obviously justified, to talk
about the expressive function of criminal law, rather than tort. Yet
the characteristics of tort law identified by civil recourse theory
suggest the ways in which tort itself, both descriptively and through
its implications, normatively, serves an expressive function as well.
We have seen how a tort can be theorized as a wrong without the
requirement of the sort of moral component we frequently demand
from the criminal law. But in the very articulation of a form of
wrong—and the corresponding creation and protection of a right—
the law expresses a value judgment, even if that judgment is simply as
to the scope of the rights it protects. One can, in other words, be a
“wrong-doer” or a “wronged” party simply because the law says so.
There is no need to carve out another space for “expressive”
124. See NEDELSKY, supra note 37, at 65.
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dignitary torts; some degree of expression is inherent in the
whole project.
Tort law, like criminal law, makes statements—be they universal
or individuated—about prohibitions, and the relationship between
those statements and social norms is as mutually reinforcing in the
torts context as it is in the criminal. 125 Specifically, tort law identifies
prohibited interferences, defining which sort of interferences count
as actionable wrongs, and in so doing impacts individuals’
experiences of ownership over their bodies. The limits on bodily
interference turn out to depend in part upon what the law has to say
about personhood, which is one of the most important expressive
products of tort. I hope to show that part of what is at stake in these
informed consent cases, and what matters for tort law more
generally, is the relationship between the subjective personhoods of
the tortfeasor and victim at the moment the former has improperly
overborn the latter.
The precise legal definition of personhood is notoriously
slippery. 126 It is nonetheless assumed, even in constitutional dictates,
as a precondition for legal protection. 127 The question of whether
the word person is simply interchangeable with human has galvanized
a great deal of debate across a number of disciplines. As the Supreme
Court decided in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad
Co., non-corporeal entities may be considered legal “persons.” 128
Proponents of legal protections for animals make the case that they
should qualify for legal personhood. 129 Fundamentally, the
125. For comprehensive treatment of the expressive functions of the law see Elizabeth S.
Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2000); Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88
IOWA L. REV. 35, 40 (2002).
126. Margaret Radin provides a summary of four philosophical theories of the person: (1)
the Kantian view of the “person as rights-holder” or a “free and rational being whose existence
is an end in itself,” (2) the Lockean view of the person as a being with self-consciousness and
memory, (3) the view of the person as a being with bodily continuity, and (4) the view of a
person as possessing a past and a future integrated by a character. MARGARET JANE RADIN,
REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 39 (1993).
127. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .”)
(emphasis added); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
128. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
129. See, e.g., Gary Francione, Animal Rights Theory and Utilitarianism: Relative
Normal Guidance, 3 ANIMAL L. 75, 83–86 (1997).
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“discrepancies in the way in which different people define
personhood reveal that there is no widely agreed upon set of criteria
that must be satisfied in order for a being to qualify as a person[,]”
and, indeed, even the disagreement as to whether humanhood is a
prerequisite means that there is “no necessary conceptual connection
between the terms ‘human’ and ‘person.’” 130
Because the concept of personhood is unsettled, the law serves
an expressive function in merely categorizing individuals and entities
as being entitled to it. The law also has the capacity to identify
certain qualities of the individual as most important to personhood
through the interests it recognizes and protects. In private law,
scholars have utilized the “personhood theory of property” to
explain the seeming hierarchy in property interests the law
recognizes under certain circumstances. 131 Scholars have debated, for
example, whether “personal” property is treated as more sacrosanct
than “fungible” property due to the subjective nature of the
relationship between person and thing, with the former category
closer to an extension of personhood than the latter. 132 By giving
certain property interests objectively greater protection than others,
the private law inherently privileges a particular account of the
subjective relationship between an individual and his possessions. 133
For example, Margaret Radin describes a continuum of “property-aspersonhood” to explain the First Amendment cases concerning

130. Luis E. Chiesa, Of Persons and the Criminal Law: (Second Tier) Personhood as a
Prerequisite for Victimhood, 28 PACE L. REV. 759, 765–66 (2008). Chiesa proposes four
“tiers” of personhood, allowing various degrees of legal protection corresponding to the
relative sentience of the entities in question. Id. at 773–78.
131. RADIN, supra note 126, at 2–3. See also Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation,
and Stories, 42 DUKE L.J. 630, 676 (1992); D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 257 (2006); Jeremy Blumenthal, “To Be Human”: A Psychological
Perspective on Property Law, 83 TUL. L. REV. 609 (2009); Mary L. Clark, Reconstructing the
World Trade Center: An Argument for the Applicability of Personhood Theory to Commercial
Property Ownership and Use, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 815, 815–16 (2005); Cheryl I. Harris,
Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1725 (1993); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1858 (2007); Michael S.
Moore, Four Reflections on Law and Morality, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1523, 1563 (2007).
But see Jeffrey Douglas Jones, Property and Personhood Revisited, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y
93 (2011).
132. RADIN, supra note 126, at 53.
133. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory,
Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 41–42 (1990) (positing the
role of post hoc narrative explanations in justifying the utility-maximizing preference ordering
associated with the classical Lockean theory of property).
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speech rights on the commercial property of others. 134 In PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins, the Supreme Court upheld, against a
Takings Clause challenge, a state supreme court recognition of
protestors’ state constitutional speech rights in a private commercial
shopping center. 135 Radin suggests that “[s]hopping center property
is not likely to be bound up with the personhood of the shopping
center owner, while public speech, especially if considered political, is
likely to be tied to the personhood of the speaker.” 136 If Radin’s
distinction here is correct, the difference between commercial
property and exercise of speech turns, at least in part, upon the
fungibility of the former relative to the highly subjective, expressive
value of the latter.
This Article is, of course, concerned with the aspects of
personhood implicated by an individual’s control over his or her own
body, which has a long tradition amongst the most basic of rights
protected by a legal order. 137 The numerous philosophical critiques
of Cartesian dualism have created a starting point for this discussion
through the basic insight that, though not identical, the
consciousness and the body are dialectically interrelated, a
phenomenon we have seen empirically in the patient context I
described earlier. 138 Most relevant from a legal standpoint, the body
can be characterized as “the conscious vulnerability of self in the
world, the felt capacity to be affected, injured.” 139 (It is presumably
this vulnerability that is recognized, for example, through the tort of
assault as distinct from battery; the former allows recovery for the
apprehension of intentional bodily harm without the requirement
that a touching actually occur.) Health ethicist Sally Gadow explains
that mastery of the body-self is necessary to an individual’s
achievement of well-being through unity. 140 Illness and aging result
134. Radin, supra note 126, at 68.
135. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
136. RADIN, supra note 126, at 68.
137. Locke’s famous justification for property rights begins with the assumption that
“every man has a Property in his own Person.” JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT, Ch. V, § 27 (1698), reprinted in JOHN LOCKE: TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 328 (P. Laslett ed., 1960).
138. Sally Gadow, Body and Self: A Dialectic, 5 J. MED. & PHIL. 172 (1980). For a range
of contemporary philosophical perspectives on the subject, see THE BODY AND THE SELF (José
Luis Bermúdez, Anthony Marcel & Naomi Eilan eds., 1995).
139. Gadow, supra note 138, at 174.
140. Id. at 179.
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in a breakdown in the body-self unity, which is generally resolved
through disengagement—negating the body’s “‘mineness’ in
emotional and perceptual terms.” 141
A detailed discussion of the considerable philosophical
scholarship on the nature of the self is beyond the scope of this
paper. Nonetheless, I take it as a starting point that (a) the
protection from harm of the physical body is a feature of both our
criminal and tort law systems and (b) “personhood”—whatever its
precise contours—is the expressive concept through which our
system declares that legal rights exist. It therefore becomes apparent
how the physical harms I earlier demonstrated as arising from a
tortfeasor’s interference with an individual’s sense of self should be
accounted for in the concept of personhood animating both our
criminal and tort systems.
The criminal law deploys narratives about blameworthiness and
condemnation into the culture at large, which potentially legitimate,
challenge, or shape the existing norms about these subjects. And
individual crime victims have their own subjective narratives about
the criminal harm they have suffered, which will circulate through
their societies and collectively contribute to a broader collective
experience of criminality. This societal experience is part of the
“public wrong” redressed by the criminal law, and will shape norms
about culpability in ways to which the formal law should
be responsive.
In the case of a tort claim, of course, there is no “public wrong”
to be redressed. Nonetheless, if we understand tort as a law of
wrongs we can see how the tort system—in defining what constitutes
a wrong and providing a forum for its redress—serves its own
expressive function. Here, however, the primary questions about
which the law provides an answer are what sorts of harms qualify for
redress, and to what extent? A victim’s narrative about the harm he
has suffered is less relevant here as part of a larger, public account of
harm which requires its own vindication. Given the plainly narrativegenerating capacity of the tort law, however, to what extent should
individuals’ narrative accounts of their harm be relevant to the
question of what constitutes a “private wrong”? Again, the
comparison to the criminal law provides some clarity.

141. Id.
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In his work on the role of crime victims in the war on crime,
Markus Dirk Dubber argues for a personhood-focused
understanding of criminal law, which casts light on the relationship
between personhood and legal wrong and its redress. 142 For Dubber,
one of the problems with the so-called war on crime is that it has
turned criminal justice into a matter between criminal threats and the
state, with an objective—served in part through the disproportionate
prosecution of “victimless” crimes such as possession—primarily to
eradicate threats against the state rather than individuals. 143 In this
context, he argues, the victims-rights movement is problematic as it
transforms individuals into generic “victims,” who are then used to
justify the eradication of threats against the state. 144 In this view, the
essence of a possession offense is “that it amounts to disobedience to
a state authority,” which makes the state itself the victim. 145 Yet
when actual victims become used as symbols to justify authoritarian
power, they become twice victimized—by the perpetrator and the
state itself, which, as Dubber points out, views itself as the
real victim. 146
While Dubber’s argument as applied to crime victims proves too
much, 147 it rests in part on an understanding of the relationship
between the criminal law and the individual. This in turn sheds light
on the role of an individual’s subjective experience in any legal
account of harm. Dubber claims that the primary aim of the criminal
law should be the protection of the autonomy of individuals, and
that we should therefore refocus ourselves on crimes where a victim’s
142. MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS (2002).
143. Id. at 32–97.
144. Id. at 335.
145. Id. at 96.
146. Id. at 193.
147. Dubber may well be correct that the interests of individual victims may be
jeopardized through their deployment as symbols for the state, but the conclusions he draws
from it (including the inappropriateness of victim impact statements in a sentencing
proceeding), are overreaching. Indeed, the inclusion of actual victim narratives in trials with
actual victims should only serve to throw into relief the victimless nature of other sorts of
crimes. It is difficult to imagine how removal of victim narratives from the former class of cases
can do anything to resolve the problem of the state substituting its own victimization for that
of the legitimate victim. As I have argued elsewhere, individual victim stories belong in the
courtroom precisely because they also circulate through society and become therefore part of
the public harm ostensibly vindicated by the criminal justice system. Erin Sheley, Reverberations
of the Victim’s “Voice”: Victim Impact Statements and the Cultural Project of Punishment, 87
IND. L.J. 1247, 1281–85 (2012).
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autonomy has been overridden by an offender. 148 Dubber argues, in
particular, for victim compensation as a possible remedy in such
cases. 149 For Dubber, personhood connects the law of compensation
with criminal punishment. 150 Such a relationship, he argues, would
treat both the offender and the victim as persons, excluding the state
as a victim and focusing on the wrong done by one individual to
another. 151 Whether or not this is an adequate description of the
purpose and function of criminal justice, it does show how attention
to the precise identities of the individuals involved in a wrongful act
can rescript the broader stories the law is able to tell about its
vindication of wrong. In particular it illustrates how the act of legal
recourse animates the relationship between two personhoods—one
impinged by the other—and posits that the acknowledgment of this
relationship can play a substantive role in a vindication of
the impingement.
Taking this relationship seriously should, as I have argued, cause
us to look more closely at the physical harm flowing from the
disruption of a patient’s illness narrative through an inappropriate
assertion of will on the part of his doctor. But it should also remind
us that in choosing to limit the legally relevant definition of
personhood by excluding certain injuries to the self from civil
recourse, the law makes a statement about personhood itself. Such
statements, if too far removed from shared notions of justice, run the
risk of undermining the legitimacy of the legal order altogether.
C. The Negligence Standard Distorts the Doctor-Patient Relationship
Understanding the third problem with the existing definition of
injury requires a return to the first prong of the negligence standard:
the measure of the physician’s duty to provide information. In half of
the jurisdictions, remember, the extent of a physician’s duty to
provide information is measured by the practices of other physicians
in the relevant medical community. In jurisdictions applying the
“reasonable patient” standard, the test becomes what information a
reasonable patient would have wanted to know. In this section I will
argue that both of these standards are illogical and fail to encourage
148.
149.
150.
151.

DUBBER, supra note 142, at 210–11.
Id. at 243–44.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 237–40.
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the physician to disclose the subjectively desirable amount of
information. Due to the interplay between incoherent standards of
duty and the limited definition of injury, the negligence test distorts
the economy of knowledge and power in the doctorpatient relationship.
1. The “physician-based” standard
Because the physician-based standard has already been the
subject of a great deal of scholarly criticism, I will not spend much
time on it here. The most common objection to using the medical
community to determine the appropriate amount of information a
patient should receive is that doctors as a group may have
occupational commitments that do not necessarily track with
patients’ actual interests. 152 In other words, doctors have expertise in
diagnosing and treating diseases, not in deciding what a private
individual deems relevant to making a highly personal decision.
Furthermore, the patterns of medical practice across the United
States have been found to be remarkably varied, in part through a
general failure to involve patients in choice of treatments that
depend upon patient preference. 153 Therefore, allowing the medical
community to be arbiters of consent runs the risk of depriving
patients of the very autonomy the concept is supposed to protect.
2. The “reasonable patient” standard
Despite the apparent relocation of authority from practitioner to
patient embodied in the “reasonable patient” standard, it too has a
number of problems. In tort law generally, the “reasonable man,” or
“reasonable person,” standard has become the template for
determining negligence. 154 The reasonable person is expected to
“know the statutory and common law, in so far as it establishes a
standard of obligatory behaviour, at the risk of incurring liability if

152. See generally KATZ, supra note 44; Morris, supra note 59, at 329.
153. John E. Wennberg & Philip G. Peters, Jr., Unwarranted Variations in the Quality of
Health Care: Can the Law Help Medicine Provide a Remedy/Remedies?, 37 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 925, 937 (2002).
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 282–83 (1965) (defining negligent conduct
as that “which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against
unreasonable risk of harm,” which standard is described as the behavior of “a reasonable man
under like circumstances”).

100

DO NOT DELETE

63

11/18/2015 2:12 PM

Rethinking Injury: The Case of Informed Consent

he falls below it.” 155 This formulation fits into the loss-allocative
conception of tort, and indeed the Restatement incorporates riskutility analysis into the judgment of the reasonable person (in the
absence of an explicit statutory command): to determine the risk of
his action an actor must consider “the extent of the chance” that his
conduct will cause harm, “the extent of the harm likely to be caused
to the interests imperiled,” and “the number of persons” exposed to
harm, in addition to “the social value which the law attaches to the
interests which are imperiled.” 156 On the side of utility, the actor
must consider “the extent of the chance” that his interest will be
advanced by his conduct, the “extent of the chance that such interest
can be adequately advanced or protected by another and less
dangerous course of conduct,” and “the social value which the law
attaches to the interest which is to be advanced or protected by
the conduct.” 157
Victim conduct is also evaluated according to risk-benefit analysis
in allocating costs between injurer and victim. The valuation of an
objective standard of care will depend upon such factors as:
(1) differences in the ability to take care among injurers and among
victims; (2) whether the injurer or victim should have been
engaging in the activity; (3) whether the injurer or victim’s ability
to take care could have been efficiently improved by earlier acts; (4)
whether the injurer or victim’s optimal level of care is materially
affected by the other’s optimal level of care; and (5) whether the
benefits of engaging in the activity for either injurers or victims are
difficult to determine and vary substantially among victims
or injurers. 158

Scholarship on liability rules in tort has sought to maximize
social welfare by inducing injurers and victims to replicate the mix of
care and activities for which they would have bargained in the
absence of transaction costs. 159
In other words, in traditional negligence regimes we think of a
potential injurer and potential victim as having reciprocal duties
155. Id. § 290 cmt. n.
156. Id. § 293.
157. Id. § 292.
158. Warren F. Schwartz, Objective and Subjective Standards of Negligence: Defining the
Reasonable Person to Induce Optimal Care and Optimal Populations of Injurers and Victims, 78
GEO. L.J. 241, 245 (1989).
159. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 179–97 (1998).
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toward one another to avoid a loss. 160 In evaluating a pedestrian’s
tort suit against a driver in any kind of comparative or contributory
negligence regime, for example, a jury will have to determine how
much care a “reasonable” pedestrian ought to be exercising to avoid
an injury upon encountering a negligent driver. If we try to fit the
doctor and patient into the roles of injurer and victim of negligence
in an informed consent case, we run into problems of logic. To avoid
the pedestrian’s injury through car accident, a driver has a duty to
exercise care in driving and a pedestrian in walking. To avoid the
patient’s injury through a nonconsensual procedure the physician has
a duty to exercise care in providing information and a patient
in . . . what?
The difficulty is that the interrelated allocation of duties between
injurers and victims with regard to which the “reasonableness” of a
“reasonable” victim is calculated cannot be applied in a coherent
fashion to our understanding of a “reasonable patient.” Unlike the
victim in other negligence settings, the patient has no affirmative
duty of care, no duty to ask for information from his doctor. 161 The
doctor, in effect, serves as a gatekeeper to information in which a
patient is assumed to be unversed. As the D.C. Circuit noted in one
of the landmark modern cases on informed consent, the duty to
volunteer information in the face of silence belongs to the physician
because “[c]aveat emptor is not the norm for the consumer of
medical services.” 162 Furthermore, and again unlike the reasonable
person in other areas of tort, the patient has no obligation to make a
reasonable decision in terms of treatment itself, but is free to accept
or reject it for any idiosyncratic reason he chooses. 163 This reflects
the origins of informed consent law in battery: actual physical harm
was not relevant as battery is a dignitary tort; therefore efforts to
measure the costs, absorbed or imposed, by potential victims make
little sense. As Grant Morris notes, “by not obligating physicians to
ask their patients what their concerns are, and then to respond to
these concerns, the [D.C. Circuit], in reality, ruled that the
160. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29,
60 (1972).
161. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
162. Id.
163. See id.at 790 (“To be sure, the objective of risk-disclosure is preservation of the
patient’s interest in intelligent self-choice on proposed treatment, a matter the patient is free to
decide for any reason that appeals to him.”).
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physician’s disclosure duty is owed, not to his or her patient, but
only to the reasonable patient.” 164
So what work, then, is the “reasonable patient” doing in a jury’s
determination of negligence? It would seem that the physician’s
liability is limited to the extent that a patient becomes unreasonable.
That is, a patient whose consent would have required an
“unreasonable” amount of information should have to bear the costs
of whatever injury flows from this lack of additional knowledge. But
what does it mean to be “reasonable” in a desire for information? In
actuality, the foundation for liability for negligence has been
described as knowledge, or its legal equivalent: “opportunity
through reasonable diligence to acquire knowledge.” 165 Liability
turns on the foreseeability of harm, and the foreseeability of harm
must depend on knowledge. 166 Indeed, a reasonable man aware of
his own ignorance as to some fact may be required to take
“precautions against possible but unknown danger.” 167 It is precisely
because of a physician’s asymmetrical access to relevant information
that the law does not allocate any of the physician’s duty to disclose
to the patient. Yet if that is the case, on what basis do we interject an
objective “reasonable patient,” whose reasonableness turns on the
assumption of possessing knowledge, into the question of whether a
particular patient was provided with adequate knowledge in a
given case?
But perhaps the reasonable person of tort is the improper model
for our reasonable patient. In cases of informed consent we are, after
all, dealing with a contract-like agreement. Indeed, the Mohr court
characterized it just so, stating “[i]f the physician advises his patient
to submit to a particular operation, and the patient weighs the
dangers and risks incident to its performance, and finally consents, he
thereby, in effect, enters into a contract authorizing his physician to
operate to the extent of the consent given, but no further.” 168
Reasonable persons differ as between tort and contract law. The
reasonable person of tort “is a more universalized personage,
164. Morris, supra note 59, at 329.
165. People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 121 N.E. 474, 476
(N.Y. 1918).
166. Fleming James, Jr., The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16 MO.
L. REV. 1, 5 (1951).
167. Id. at 6.
168. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 15 (Minn. 1905).
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reflective of the general duties of care owed to fellow human
beings,” while the reasonable person of contract “is a more
specialized creature, possessing all of the idiosyncratic features of the
contracting parties viewed within the context of their
interaction[,] . . . [and] is more concerned with what people actually
do in a specific marketplace.” 169 In contract, even under the
objective theory, in which the “reasonable person” serves as an
independent interpreter of the expressions of contract, it has been
noted that “a contract shall have the meaning that a reasonable
person would give it under the circumstances under which it was
made, if he knew everything he should plus everything the parties
actually knew.” 170 The “reasonable person” of contract is thus the
interpreter used to determine liability flowing from consent; liability
is, in these cases, premised on an assumption of knowledge. Again,
an attempt to import the doctor and patient into the roles of
contracting parties becomes complicated. If we say that the
agreement to perform a procedure is a contract and the disputed
term in an informed consent case is the scope of authority yielded to
the doctor, the question should be what a reasonable person in the
patient’s position would have understood the degree of authority to
be if he knew everything he should. But in cases of failure to obtain
informed consent, the question of authority itself turns on the
adequacy of information provided by the doctor.
These examples from tort and contract demonstrate the difficulty
in using an objective standard to determine the adequate amount of
information required by a patient in a situation in which the doctor
effectively serves as the gatekeeper to knowledge. The concept of
“reasonableness” is generally deployed in the first place to hold
actors responsible for obtaining knowledge. In an informed consent
case, the analysis assumes the existence of “unknown unknowns”—in
other words, the fact that there was information about treatment
which no patient would have been expected to know—and asks the
ex post question of whether a reasonable person would have wanted
to know it in order to make a treatment decision. Yet, because the
law purports to recognize a patient’s right to exercise authority over
his own bodily integrity, a patient has no reciprocal duty of care in
169. Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard
and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REV. 293, 317–18 (1997).
170. W. David Slawson, The Futile Search for Principles for Default Rules, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 29, 38 (1993) (emphasis added).
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making those treatment decisions in a particular way. The
“reasonable patient,” then, is an incoherent arbiter of the value truly
protected by the doctrine of informed consent: the physician’s duty
to provide information to which only he or she has access for a
patient to use to his or her own idiosyncratic ends in making
decisions about the disposition of his or her body.
Despite these theoretical difficulties presented by the objective
standard, there are obviously very good reasons to protect a
physician from the potentially limitless idiosyncrasies that could
motivate different patients to desire unpredictably differing amounts
of information (remembering too, of course, that some patients
might prefer not to be told of sufficiently remote risks, or be
presented with so much information as to render them confused). 171
Furthermore, a purely subjective test might allow patients bitter over
a bad medical outcome to allege lack of consent by falsely testifying
that they would have made a different decision from the one they
made had they had additional information. 172 And, as courts have
noted, a subjective standard might prevent a patient’s next of kin
from recovering in cases where the patient dies as a result of the
procedure. 173 Though Oregon and Oklahoma have experimented
with versions of a subjective standard, courts have limited it in
practice and it remains an anomaly. 174
IV. A NEW PROPOSAL
Having shown how the shortcomings of the current definition of
injury under informed consent result from a higher-level theoretical
debate, I will now propose a specific doctrinal fix.
A. Liability Standard
Because the interaction between illness, medical care, and the
stories patients tell to navigate the two have such significant effects
on overall health, the account of harm recognized by informed

171. See, e.g., Ashe v. Radiation Oncology Assocs., 9 S.W.3d 119, 122 (Tenn. 1999).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. King & Moulton, supra note 18, at 444–45. Some scholars of law and medicine
have also advanced proposals for new systems of “shared decision-making,” which would
involve patient and doctor in a dialogue intended to illuminate a patient’s subjective
informational needs ahead of time. Id.
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consent law should not ignore the importance of subjective
experience in deciding when a physician should determine and defer
to a patient’s actual preferences for treatment. Nonetheless, when
the law defines a legal wrong it negotiates two distinct personhoods.
A physician’s personhood is also implicated in the doctor-patient
relationship, in his various competing duties as a doctor, and
through his interest in practicing medicine in the way that reflects his
own values and judgment. A more nuanced attention to the legal
account of harm would afford the patient’s personhood greater
protection while retaining some of the protections to the doctor’s
available under the current regime.
As noted in Part III.C, supra, some scholars have argued for an
abolishment of both the physician-centered and “reasonable patient”
standards of duty in favor of a purely subjective, patient-based
standard. However, a proper understanding of the nature of the
uninformed patient’s injury urges a third, superior way. Under the
current negligence test for informed consent claims, a plaintiff must
demonstrate, remember, three elements: (1) the physician’s breach
of duty to provide information (measured by either the physiciancentered or reasonable patient standard); (2) that the patient would
have forgone the recommended treatment had he or she known that
information; and (3) the existence of an injury as a result. In lieu of
changing the first prong to a purely subjective standard, a more
nuanced understanding of the “injury” suffered by any patient who
undergoes a procedure in the absence of consent will allow us to
productively consider the relationship between the second and third
prongs of this test.
In other words, in cases where it can be shown at the second
prong of the current negligence standard that a patient would in fact
have forgone a particular recommended treatment if he had been in
possession of all relevant information, then he is entitled to a
rebuttable presumption that he has suffered an injury—without
having to show a particular physical harm. This standard has the
obvious benefit of recognizing that physicians inflict very real
physical harms by interfering with patient illness narratives through
undesired treatment. It likewise has the benefit of administrability.
The question of causation—i.e., whether the patient would have
forgone treatment with adequate information—is already one that
must be answered under the current regime, and has been a bar to
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claims where no such showing could be made. 175 Furthermore, the
collapsing of the third prong into the second prong would not entail
the same degree of ex ante guesswork on the part of the physician
that would result from the substitution of a purely subjective
standard at prong one. Under the proposed regime, a physician’s
duty would still be limited by a jury’s determination, under one
objective standard or another, of what constituted adequate
disclosure, without reference to the potential idiosyncrasies of a
particular patient. However, if by such a standard it can be
determined that a physician breached his duty and that such a breach
led to the overbearing of a patient’s personhood through the
imposition of an otherwise unwanted procedure, a patient should be
presumed to have been injured.
B. Remedial Rules
In the previous sections I have endeavored to show that, due to
the relationship between knowledge, autonomy, and patient
narrative on the one hand, and physiological well-being on the
other, a cognizable injury occurs when a patient can show that he
would have forgone a particular treatment in the absence of full
information from his physician. I have also shown that failure to
recognize the general integration of the expressive aspect of an injury
with a victim’s experience of the injury has led to an unresolved
debate about the appropriate role of “punitive” considerations in
recognizing tort injuries. This debate is made more troubling by the
lessons on systemic legitimacy we can take from the situation of the
victim in the criminal justice system. The most obvious objection at
this juncture is that, even if we accept these contentions to be true,
the impossibility of calculating actual damages in the absence of a
measurable physical injury should preclude recovery.
The tort law, of course, already allows juries to make awards
based upon a victim’s pain and suffering attendant to a physical
harm; rather than requiring clear economic valuations for such harm,
jurors are allowed to assess damages through recourse to their
“collective enlightened conscience.” 176 Furthermore, the tort of
175. See, e.g., Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150 (Ala. 1985); Wilson v. Merritt, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 630 (Ct. App. 2006); Funke v. Fieldman, 512 P.2d 539 (Kan. 1973); Matthies v.
Mastromonaco, 709 A.2d 238 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); Bubb v. Brusky, 768 N.W.2d
903 (Wis. 2009).
176. E.g., RONALD W. EADES, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS
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intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) requires that juries
determine whether a defendant’s conduct rose to the level of
“extreme and outrageous,” without precise guidance as to the
meaning of the words. 177 Yet damages for pain and suffering—as well
as for negligent infliction of emotional distress, which can be
recovered with a lower showing of culpability than that required for
IIED—are generally only recoverable pendent to a showing of
concrete physical harm. 178 Indeed, in the medical malpractice context
generally, the mere existence of a “pain and suffering” component to
a jury award for a negligently inflicted injury has drawn a particularly
large amount of criticism. 179 These critiques flow in part from the
conception of the primary goals of tort law as deterrence and
compensation (or “insurance”). 180
Law and economics scholars have suggested that pain and
suffering damages are unnecessary to achieve deterrence because
customers know the quality of the goods at issue and damages
therefore serve mainly to insure against injuries. 181 Because people
facing a risk of injury or death will insure against economic, but not
noneconomic, losses, the argument goes, the justification for
compensating noneconomic losses is weak. 182 The counterargument
321 (3d ed. 1993) (“There are no objective guidelines by which you can measure the money
equivalent of this element of injury; the only real measuring stick, if it can be so described, is
your collective enlightened conscience. You should consider all the evidence bearing on the
nature of the injuries, the certainty of future pain, the severity and the likely duration thereof.
In this difficult task of putting a money figure on an aspect of injury that does not readily lend
itself to an evaluation in terms of money, you should try to be as objective, calm and
dispassionate as the situation will permit, and not to be unduly swayed by considerations
of sympathy.”).
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
178. See, e.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1702 (2004) (defining “serious injury” as “[a]
personal injury resulting in death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious
disfigurement”); Brooks v. Odom, 696 A.2d 619, 623–24 (N.J. 1997) (holding that for a
plaintiff to recover for pain and suffering under the Tort Claims Act, he must sustain a
substantial “permanent loss of a bodily function” (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:92(d) (2000)).
179. Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us About
Jury Behavior and the Tort System, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1205, 1224 (1994); NEIL VIDMAR,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY
INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 7 (1995).
180. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice
Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 399–400 (2005).
181. See id. at 400.
182. Id. (citing George L. Priest, Can Absolute Manufacturer Liability Be Defended?, 9
YALE J. ON REG. 237, 252 (1992); Richard A. Epstein, The Legal and Insurance Dynamics of
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to this view is the position that, due to patients’ lack of knowledge of
the true quality of goods at the time of contracting, and to the
investment in quality that takes place after the initial contract
formation, noneconomic damages do have some deterrent value. 183
Yet if this is the case, it presents problems for assessing the degree of
damages to be awarded, due to the principle of economic theory
suggesting that it is not optimal to compensate victims fully for
noneconomic losses in contexts where compensation functions
partially as insurance, because victims necessarily pay for this up front
in terms of higher prices. 184
Ellen Smith Pryor has critiqued the entire insurance conception
of compensation in medical malpractice cases due in part to its
inability to account for the highly subjective valuations of money,
loss, and quality of life held by the disabled. 185 In particular, she
notes that the theoretical division of losses into generallycompensable “pecuniary” losses and “nonpecuniary” losses, which
some theorists argue should only be compensable if they increase the
marginal utility of money, “requires both the owner’s subjective
judgment about whether an equivalent commodity is available for
particular aspects of various losses and the owner’s subjective
valuation of the loss.” 186 And so, for example, one disabled patient
might find a handicapped bicycle to be an acceptable substitute for
the cycling he had done prior to his injury, whereas another might
find it an unacceptable substitute for running. The “nonpecuniary”
component of the losses experienced by each would therefore be
different. If Pryor is correct, then drawing the line between the two
types of losses in a particular way expresses an able person’s narrative
of how the effects of bodily harm and incapacitation should
be valued.
In any case, as I have attempted to show in Part III, the nature
of the physical harm flowing from an unwanted medical procedure
Mass Tort Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 475, 490–91, 506 (1984); Alan Schwartz, Proposals
for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 408 (1988)).
183. Id. at 401 (citing Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Malpractice Liability for
Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929, 1979 (2003)).
184. Id. at 402.
185. Ellen Smith Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency, and the Kingdom of the Ill: A
Critique of the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 79 VA. L. REV 91, 97 (1993).
186. Id. at 101–04, 130–31. Pryor makes the point that, due to the variability of
subjective judgments about replaceability and valuation, the insurance theory’s purported
reliance on subjective judgments is particularly unattractive. Id. at 135.
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may be less obvious than the related losses—pecuniary or not—that
generally form the basis for pain and suffering awards. Therefore,
even if it is true that aggregated data of the sort I discussed above
strongly suggest that some sort of physical harm occurs in these cases,
the challenge of calculating it in an individual instance seems
formidable enough to urge against what might seem to be a
specious—and easily abused—attempt. This argument is even
stronger when coupled with a physician’s inherent duty of
beneficence, a duty it would be pragmatically undesirable to chill and
which implicates the physician’s own legal personhood as embodied
in his right to exercise the professional judgment with which he has
been entrusted in a manner consistent with his own conscience.
Let us return, for example, to the case of the Mohr plaintiff, but
imagine that her surgery had gone rather differently. Let us imagine
that, as the record suggests, she was terrified of the prospect of
surgery even on the agreed-upon ear. Let us also imagine that, as the
record likewise suggests, avoiding the surgery entirely would have
resulted in diminished hearing and lifelong ear infections, but no risk
of death or serious incapacitation. Under these circumstances,
suppose her physician strongly urges her to endure the surgery, with
its attendant physical and psychological side effects, without
presenting the alternative of no action as a feasible option. Suppose
she undergoes the surgery, which is performed non-negligently, and
recovers some hearing in the agreed-upon ear. We may, upon review
of the preceding sections, understand that her unnecessary loss of
autonomy, coupled with the physical trauma of surgery could—for
someone deeply affected by such things—result in physical harm
through the stress mechanisms triggered by a usurpation of her
control over her world. In the regime proposed in this article, as
emphasized in the last section, it would be crucial to prove that she
in fact would have forgone the surgery before a cause of action for
negligence would arise. But even if she could prove this, how much
was she harmed by an otherwise non-negligent surgery that restored
some degree of measurable health? We don’t know, after all, what
her overall physical health would have been in the counterfactual
world in which she did not endure the surgery.
To answer the question of remedies I return again to the
relationship between tort and criminal punishment. The distinction
between private and public law remedies is as old as Blackstone’s
Commentaries. Private law remedies restore something to the victim,
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as opposed to criminal punishment, which provides a benefit to the
public. 187 Yet scholars of tort and remedies have long noted that this
dichotomy is not absolute; as Anthony Sebok notes, “even legal
novices learn quickly that the generalization has exceptions, either
built directly into the law (such as punitive damages), or into its
results (such as disgorgement).” 188 If we consider that the “makewhole” measure of compensatory damages may be wholly
unadministrable in informed consent cases, it does not, therefore,
follow that the wrong suffered by the hypothetical Mohr plaintiff
cannot be compensated. I argue now that a focus on the respective
personhoods of doctor and patient and the ways in which lack of
consent improperly alters the relationship between the two parties
provides us with a way of thinking about how the tort system can
function, with some degree of precision, to correct this imbalance.
Sebok’s two examples of the exceptions to the compensatory
function of tort provide us with the most obvious candidates, and I
will consider them in turn.
1. Punitive damages
Punitive damages allow juries to wield a large degree of
discretion in increasing a tort victim’s damages based upon the
mental attitude of the tortfeasor. The theoretical justifications for
punitive damages—as exceptional as they appear against the generally
compensatory justifications for tort law—are various. Commentators
disagree as to the motivating principles behind punitive damages;
they include everything from “punishment” and “deterrence” to
education, retribution, compensation, and law enforcement. 189
Significantly, it has been noted that one appropriate role of punitive
damages may be “compensating victims for otherwise
uncompensable losses.” 190
At first blush, punitive damages appear an attractive means of
compensating for a patient’s bodily interference. Pendent punitive
damages in trespass may be supported by nominal actual damages,
187. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *7.
188. Anthony J. Sebok, What Does it Mean to Say that a Remedy Punishes?, 78 CHI.KENT L. REV. 3, 4 (2003).
189. David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39
VILL. L. REV. 363, 365–66, 373–74 (1994).
190. See, e.g., Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages,
56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1982).
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and cases of informed consent—particularly once we understand the
substantial, yet amorphous, physical consequences they may
implicate—present an obvious parallel (this parallel, no doubt,
resulted in the earlier battery conception of informed consent). In
both cases, the defendant has violated some crucial aspect of the
defendant’s personhood in a way that transcends a showing of actual
loss. The “education” function of punitive damages would take the
form, in these cases, of statements about the sanctity of personhood
made by legal protections. If a physician interferes with a
complicated relationship between a patient’s self and body in
performing non-consensual procedures, the expression of this
violated relationship through tort remedy is an appealing result.
In their application of Jean Hampton’s analysis of retributivism
in the criminal context to the case of punitive damages, Marc
Galanter and David Luban note that in both cases “the wrongdoer
has implicitly asserted a kind of undeserved mastery and superiority
over the victim” and “[t]he purpose of punishment is to reassert the
truth about the relative value of wrongdoer and victim by inflicting a
publicly visible defeat on the wrongdoer.” 191 Structurally, this
suggests the appropriateness of punitive damages as a remedy for
cases of inadequate informed consent. After all, the very nature of
the problem is a physician’s improper assertion of mastery over his
patient by deciding that his judgment was more important than
the patient’s.
Furthermore, punitive damages have a long history of utility in
cases where the most significant harm can be classed as in some way
psychological. 192 Indeed, in Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool
Group, the Supreme Court, articulating a more robust standard of
review for Due Process challenges to punitive damages awards, relied
upon a changed historical understanding of the function of punitive
damages, one that moved from compensation for intangible injuries
to the exercise of moral judgment about a defendant’s behavior. 193
Yet scholars have disagreed as to whether the Court correctly

191. Galanter & Luban, supra note 3, at 1432; see also Ellis, supra note 190, at 14–15
(noting that “[t]he reported cases from roughly the first quarter of the seventeenth century
through the first quarter of the nineteenth century” involving large damage awards unrelated
to tangible loss “all involved acts that resulted in affronts to the honor of the victims”).
192. See Sebok, supra note 3, at 197–204 (2003) (surveying the nineteenth-century
authority for imposing punitive damages in cases of emotional suffering and insult).
193. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
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understood the historical tradition of punitive damages as serving
this sort of compensatory function, and, in any case, it is clear that
today punitive damages are frequently awarded based upon a jury’s
determination of the defendant’s improper state of mind. For
example, the tort of intentionally inflicted emotional distress (IIED)
is actionable where the defendant intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress by extreme and outrageous conduct. 194
IIED does not require a showing of an underlying physical injury,
and punitive damages are supported by the defendant’s intentionality
in his actions. 195
For several reasons, then, punitive damages may be an overly
blunt cudgel with which to compensate victims of overreaching
physicians. In the first place, particularly when considered in the
context of a physician’s legally and ethically imposed duty of
beneficence, it is difficult to characterize the failure of informed
consent as the sort of moral misconduct underlying torts such as
IIED. To return to Hampton’s retributive framework for a moment,
while both a criminal’s over-valuation of his own interests over that
of his victim and a physician’s over-valuation of his own judgment
over that of his patient result in the sort of affront to personhood
punitive damages may serve to redress, the major distinction between
those cases should be apparent. In many, if not most, cases of failed
informed consent, a physician’s inappropriate substitution of
judgment is at least done with the intention of benefitting the
patient. There are doubtless extreme cases in which that is not true—
for example, the ordering of an unnecessary surgery in order to
advance the physician’s own research—and in these cases punitive
damages might well be appropriate, regardless of the outcome or
competence of the procedure. 196 But the basic case—a well-

194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
195. See id.
196. In the famous case of the incendiary Ford Pinto, for example, the jury awarded $125
million in punitive damages to a boy who had been badly burned after the Pinto he was riding
in exploded; the jury gave this award after learning that Ford had relied on a study that showed
the costs of recalling the Pinto would outweigh the benefits (estimated at $200,000 per burn
death avoided and $67,000 per injury avoided) by $100 million. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 370 (Ct. App. 1981). As Galanter and Luban put it, it is not simply
that Ford had displayed contempt for the plaintiff’s value, but it had displayed “a certain kind
of contempt,” as though he possessed “merely a price, not a dignity.” Galanter & Luban,
supra note 3, at 1436. A doctor who, through the provision of inadequate information,
utilized his patient’s body as an object for the advancement of his own skills or research
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intentioned infliction of harm through failure to take a patient’s
decision-making into account—does not rise to the level that would
justify an automatic award of punitive damages. To recognize that a
harm has been inflicted which warrants compensation is not enough,
in and of itself, to justify the particularly heightened “expressive
defeat” implicit in punitive damages. Indeed, the inability to
distinguish between these cases would severely compromise the
ability of the tort system to perform an expressive function in this
context at all.
In the second place, allowing punitive damages for all cases of
inadequate informed consent potentially opens the door to even
greater imprecision in calculating awards than would some attempt
at determining appropriate loss compensation. We generally utilize
punitive damages to force potential tortfeasors to refrain from
conduct which, like keeping the Ford Pinto on the market, is
economically justified. In the case of medical malpractice, the
potential tortfeasor is by definition an individual, as opposed to an
organization, with a stake in his professional reputation, which
would be jeopardized by any sort of finding of negligence in his
process for obtaining informed consent. To improve upon the
current situation does not, therefore, require default recourse to
punitive damages, simply the creation of some sort of outlet for
redress. Furthermore, some scholars have noted that juries may not
be particularly good at following instructions about punitive
damages, and if this is the case, the potential for excessive awards
poses significant problems of overdeterrence. 197 Therefore, even if
one operates from a wrongs-based theory of tort and finds a place in
this context for a punitive remedy for an otherwise uncompensable
harm, the availability of punitive damages in these cases jeopardizes
both retributive (“desert” based) and utilitarian goals.
priorities would be guilty of exactly such a contempt for dignity, and would be deserving of the
expressive condemnation implicit in punitive damages.
197. For evidence that juries may not be particularly good at following instructions about
punitive damages, see, e.g., Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The
Jury’s Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901 (1998); David Schkade et al.,
Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (2000); W. Kip
Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 313 (2001). But
see Neil Vidmar, Juries Don’t Make Legal Decisions! And Other Problems: A Critique of Hastie et
al. on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 705, 711 (1999); Theodore Eisenberg &
Martin T. Wells, Punitive Awards After BMW, a New Capping System, and the Reported
Opinion Bias, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 387; Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages: Should Juries
Decide?, 82 TEX. L. REV. 381 (2003) (book review).
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2. Disgorgement
Yet the appropriateness of punitive remedies in informed consent
cases does not depend upon the availability of punitive damages.
Remember that at the heart of the harm I have attempted to
articulate in this article is the power relationship between doctor and
patient and the physical effects of the expressive imbalances created by
asymmetrical knowledge. This harm may be best vindicated by a
remedy that takes this relationship into account; one that, as Sebok
notes, is punitive not in form but in result: disgorgement. It should
be remembered that a doctor and patient are neither unrelated
parties (such as a property owner and theoretical trespasser) nor yet
is the doctor a purely selfless purveyor of healing. In reality, they are
parties to a contractual relationship, in which both stand to profit:
the patient through healing and the doctor through compensation.
The fact that in most cases an insurance company mediates the
physician’s compensation should not obscure the fact that the doctor
is being paid to provide a client with a service in precisely the same
manner as an attorney is paid.
Remedies theorists have noted a distinction between “propertylike” rights and so-called “rights against interference.” 198 In general,
a plaintiff can recover restitutionary damages where the defendant
appropriates his property, violates his intellectual property, or puts
his name or image to a commercial use. 199 By contrast, victims of
battery, negligence, nuisance, or defamation cannot recover these
damages in most cases, even where the defendant has profited. 200
Ernest Weinrib has argued that, within a corrective justice
framework, restitutionary damages such as disgorgement “ought to
be available only insofar as they correspond to a constituent element
in the wrong that the defendant has done to the plaintiff.” 201 For
Weinrib, disgorgement should be available in cases of property-type
torts because included within the concept of property itself is “the
proprietor’s entitlement [to] the potential gains from the property’s
use or alienation.” 202 By contrast, disgorgement should not be
198. See, e.g., James Gordley, The Purpose of Awarding Restitutionary Damages: A Reply
to Professor Weinrib, 1 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 39, 42 (2000).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 THEORETICAL
INQ. L.1, 7(2000).
202. Id.
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available in other contexts solely to promote punitive or deterrent
goals because those cases cannot account for why the plaintiff, in
particular, should be entitled to reap the defendant’s gain, and
therefore plaintiffs in such cases should be limited to actual harm. 203
However, the mere distinction between property-like rights and
the right to be free from interference by others is necessarily hazy. 204
Indeed, “[r]ecognition of the rights against interference is necessary
to constitute a property right and to make it valuable.” 205
Conversely, Radin’s theory of property as personhood certainly
demonstrates the ways in which the concept of property grows out
of the concept of the self. 206 A physician who benefits from his
interference with a patient’s physical person has inflicted a harm, and
where this harm has translated into enrichment, it strains logic to
imagine that the patient is not the proper party to recover the value
of that enrichment simply because his property in his self would not
have profited him by the same economic metric through which the
physician profited.
Furthermore, disgorgement is available in legal contexts beyond
the unjust enrichment from simple appropriation of another’s
property. It is a foundational premise, for example, in the law of
fiduciaries. A fiduciary who wrongfully gains through the use of his
position must disgorge that gain to his beneficiary even if the
beneficiary has suffered no loss. 207 A fiduciary is liable in such cases
because a person should not profit from his own wrong, because
requiring disgorgement gives effect to the beneficiary’s implicit
expectations, and because disgorgement shapes the conduct of
fiduciaries to reflect the reasonable expectations of beneficiaries. 208
The relationship between a doctor and patient bears a striking
structural resemblance to that between a principal and an agent in a
fiduciary relationship. When a patient submits to a medical
procedure, he temporarily cedes control of his property in himself to
his physician. This separation of ownership and control provides the
opportunity for the physician to appropriate some of the value of the
203. Id. at 36–37.
204. Gordley, supra note 198, at 44.
205. Id.
206. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
207. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 cmts. d, e (2006).
208. Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1049–56 (1991).

116

DO NOT DELETE

63

11/18/2015 2:12 PM

Rethinking Injury: The Case of Informed Consent

patient’s body—not measured, of course, in the dollar value
applicable in most fiduciary contexts, but through the transformation
of the patient’s subjective valuation of his body (his desire, for
example, to preserve it from surgery) into objective financial gain for
the physician. Like the agent who may be unable, in the face of
unanticipated contingencies, to promise particular results and whose
duty is therefore legally limited to a broad requirement of “good
faith,” a physician cannot anticipate all potential complications from
a particular course of treatment and is therefore bound by broad
standards of care and duties such as “doing no harm.” And, like the
principal who may be prevented from direct monitoring of his agent
through prohibitive costs or lack of expert knowledge, a patient—as
discussed in Part III of this article—lacks the knowledge to
adequately monitor his physician’s translation of knowledge.
The similarity of the doctor-patient relationship to that of
fiduciaries therefore illustrates the appropriateness of disgorgement
as a remedy for the performance of a medical procedure without
providing enough information to obtain informed consent. A patient
who has consented to a procedure they would otherwise have
forgone with adequate information has suffered a physical harm, and
that harm has translated into profit for the physician who imposed it.
Understanding the nature of the wrong theoretically encompassed
by the doctrine of informed consent allows us to see how it is an
interference with personhood through the usurpation of a patient’s
subjective strategies for coping with illness and healing. The very loss
of control occasioned by illness is a compromise of personhood
exacerbated by a doctor’s unwanted intervention. Because the
remedy of disgorgement captures and reifies this relational dynamic,
it is the appropriate instrument through which the tort system can
recognize the unique wrong such a dynamic may create.
V. CONCLUSION
This article began with the observation that tort law has been
plagued by a kind of schizophrenia as to the sorts of harms it
recognizes as the basis for recovery, and the purposes—expressive or
compensatory—for which such recovery exists. I have also
endeavored to show how individual victims’ subjective experiences of
their harms may, under certain circumstances, become constitutive of
those harms themselves, and that our definition of legal wrong
should thus account for them. Fully understanding this phenomenon
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is a first step toward resolving the dichotomies that have troubled the
field. Taking the example of criminal law, I argued that, due to the
role of individual victims’ subjective experiences in forming the
collective experience of crime, such narratives should enter the penal
system at the punishment phase as part of the public wrong being
redressed. Because the tort system has a parallel expressive
function—which it exercises through the definition of private
wrongs—it should also, to the extent consistent with the rule of law,
attend to the role of victim narrative in defining harm. In both of
these contexts the protection of personhood depends in part on
understanding the relationship between “physical” harm and the
mental experience thereof, and our legal account of personhood
would be more legitimate if it expressed this understanding.
I have focused in particular on the tort arising from a physician’s
failure to provide enough information to obtain adequate informed
consent because it occupies a strange and enlightening space in the
tort field. With historical underpinnings in battery and a
contemporary negligence standard that, when unpacked, imports a
loss-allocative standard of duty into a space where it cannot function
coherently, the law should define this tort with a more robust
understanding of the nature of the wrong it theoretically redresses.
But the relationship between personhood, narrative, and legal harm
has application well beyond this example, in both the criminal law
and tort contexts. 209 The ideas presented in this article are intended
209. In the debate, for example, about the controversial status of hate crimes, a common
argument against their constitutionality criticizes the expressive element of the criminal
misconduct as violating the First Amendment. See generally Craig Peyton Gaumer, Punishment
for Prejudice: A Commentary on the Constitutionality and Utility of State Statutory Responses to
the Problem of Hate Crimes, 39 S.D. L. REV. 1 (1994) (critiquing hate crime statutes as
“statutes designed to punish racist, sexist, and other bigoted beliefs”). Defenders of such
statutes point to the additional psychological harms imposed on victims of hate crimes as
constituting an additional element susceptible of punishment. See generally Lu-in Wang, The
Transforming Power of “Hate”: Social Cognition Theory and the Harms of Bias-Related Crime,
71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47 (1997) (“[T]he asserted justification for penalty enhancement is that
crimes motivated by group-based bias impose greater harms than their parallel crimes, and that
the state’s desire to redress these special harms provided the basis for the Supreme Court’s
finding that penalty enhancement is constitutionally permissible and does not merely punish
offensive thought in violation of the First Amendment.”) (footnote omitted). A more robust
understanding of the relationship between the disruption of self-narrative and physical harm
would provide a more solid basis for legitimating these statutes. Furthermore, if we understand
the Second Amendment as protecting expressive aspects of personhood, we should see how
both the personhood of the offender in such cases (through speech) and that of the victim
(through association) are implicated in cases of hate crimes, and that a proper understanding of
the Second Amendment must negotiate between the two.
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to encourage such conversations, which will be enriched with
continued dialogue between the fields of law, psychology,
and narratology.
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